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Sometimes the possibility of being publicly identified as a
complainant will be enough to discourage a person from
complaining. That is especially true when being identified as a
complainant exposes her to a greater likelihood of reprisal. This
Article addresses the circumstances when such publicity can be
deemed materially adverse, such that it ought to be sufficient to
support a claim of retaliation. It focuses on the particular context
of claims of employment discrimination, especially pursuant to
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. When an employee or
applicant for employment files a charge of discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),
the EEOC undertakes a process that is neither wholly public nor
wholly private. The EEOC and its employees are statutorily
required to treat the charge confidentially, upon penalty of fine
or imprisonment. Nevertheless, charging parties sometimes
publicize the filing of their charges to exploit the possibility that
the threat of negative publicity will induce their employers to
negotiate or settle. The quasi-public nature of the EEOC's charge
and investigation process has resulted in an important doctrinal
gap in Title VII retaliation jurisprudence. While courts have
refined the doctrine of statutory retaliation significantly in recent
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years, most notably in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White, no unified
body of law addresses whether or in what circumstances an
employer's disclosure of the existence and identity of a
complainant amounts to a materially adverse action under Title
VII This lack of guidance in the retaliation case law and the fact
that the EEOC's confidentiality requirements under Title VII are
facially inapplicable to the parties necessitate seeking alternative
sources of guidance in cases alleging retaliatory disclosure. We
look to several sources of guidance to craft a framework that
courts should use when analyzing claims of retaliatory
disclosure. First, we look to the guidelines that federal courts use
to determine whether a litigant should be allowed to proceed
anonymously. Second, the White material adverse action
standard focuses on actions that "could well dissuade a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination." Thus, we look to social science research
examining whistleblower motivation to give some guidance on
what, in reality, affects an individual's decision to complain or
not complain about a perceived wrongdoing. Finally, we
consider how to incorporate into our framework of retaliatory
disclosure those employment discrimination standards that
clearly encourage employers to take effective remedial action,
which may require disclosure of complainant identity.
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INTRODUCTION
Oscar Wilde is purported to have said, "The only thing worse
than being talked about is not being talked about."' Similarly, P.T.
Barnum and others have been credited with variations on the
statement, "There's no such thing as bad publicity."' This Article
explores a particular context-when an employer widely discloses the
identity of a discrimination complainant or charging party-in which
Wilde and Barnum were woefully mistaken. A whistleblower, in some
instances, will covet anonymity. She may find that public disclosure of
her identity is threatening and can lead to adverse consequences. As a
result, the employer that "talks" or "publicizes" may find itself
subject to a claim of unlawful retaliation. But the line that delineates
1. See Quotation Details, Quotation #39714, THE QUOTATIONS PAGE,
http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/39714.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
2. See There Is No Such Thing as Bad Publicity, THE PHRASE FINDER,
http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/there-is-no-such-thing-as-bad-publicity.htm (last
visited Feb. 4, 2013) (noting that, despite widespread attribution to him, no hard evidence
links Barnum to the phrase, and indicating that the most clearly attributable variation is
Irish writer Brendan Behan's: "There's no such thing as bad publicity except your own
obituary.").
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bad publicity (i.e., retaliation) from permissible disclosure (e.g.,
investigation, idle chatter) needs clarification. In this Article, we offer
a framework to analyze when an employer's disclosure of a
complainant's identity should be labeled "retaliatory disclosure," such
that it is a materially adverse action upon which a claimant can base
an additional claim of retaliation. We begin with a brief case study.
For twenty-six years, Belmont Abbey College ("Belmont
Abbey" or the "College"), an institution founded by Benedictine
Monks and identified as a Benedictine Catholic college,3 offered
health insurance benefits that included coverage for prescription
contraception.' In December 2007, Belmont Abbey changed its
health insurance benefits to exclude coverage for oral contraceptives
as well as abortions, vasectomies, and tubal ligations. Belmont
Abbey's Catholic traditions include religious teachings prohibiting
the use of contraception.6 The decision to remove this coverage was,
as expressed by many members of the Belmont Abbey community,
including faculty, staff, and students, a way to align practice with the
beliefs the College espouses. 7
Not everyone in the Belmont Abbey community, however,
agreed. Eight faculty members-six men and two women-filed a
charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") alleging that the change in the College's health insurance
plan denying contraceptive benefits discriminated against them on the
3. See BELMONT ABBEY COLL., OUR HISTORY, http://www.belmontabbeycollege
.edu/pdf/BelmontAbbeyHistory.pdf.
4. Yaakov Menken, EEOC vs. Belmont Abbey, Continued, CROSS-CURRENTS (Oct.
21, 2009), http://www.cross-currents.com/archives/2009/10/21/eeoc-vs-belmont-abbey-
continued/ (interviewing David Neipert, one of the Belmont Abbey charging parties, who
is reported to have said that the College offered coverage for these services for twenty-six
years).
5. Dena S. Davis, Contraception, Abortion, and Health Care Reform: Finding
Appropriate Moral Ground, 29 Miss. C. L. REV. 379, 381 (2010) (summarizing popular
press articles about the case); see also Jack Stripling, Rebuke for Religion-Driven Policy,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 11, 2009, 3:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered
.comlnews/2009/08/11/belmont.
6. See, e.g., The Truth About Birth Control, CATHS. UNITED FOR FAITH,
http://www.cuf.org/2004/04/choose-life-that-you-and-your-children-may-live-the-truth-
about-birth-controll (last updated Sept. 27, 2007) ("Under no circumstances is the use of
contraception morally permissible. This infallible teaching of the Catholic Church flows
from the natural law as given to us by God. As such, the teaching applies to all men and
women." (citing Pope Paul VI, HUMANAE VITAE 18 (1968) and CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH 1 2036)).
7. See Menken, supra note 4 (relying on student blog comments for evidence to
support the claim that many members of the community supported the change).
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basis of gender and religion.' The gender-based discrimination claim
arose because excluding prescription contraceptives impacts women
exclusively.' The religion-based claim focused on the College denying
coverage to faculty and staff who did not hold the same religious
beliefs as the College.10
William Thierfelder became president of Belmont Abbey in
2004. His path to academia was atypical in that he held prominent
positions in the sports business community prior to becoming
President of the College." His reaction to the charge of
discrimination filed by faculty in 2007 also was somewhat atypical.1
2
He sent an e-mail to faculty, staff, and students notifying them of the
claim based on the revised Belmont Abbey health insurance benefits
coverage and identifying by name the eight faculty members who
filed the complaint with the EEOC.13 This e-mail resulted in an
additional EEOC charge against the College-this one alleging
retaliation.14
In a July 30, 2009 Determination Letter ("Determination
Letter"), the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe Belmont
Abbey had discriminated against the charging parties based on sex
but found "no cause" supporting the religious discrimination charge."
Separately, the EEOC indicated that Thierfelder's e-mail to faculty,
staff, and students in which he identified individually the faculty that
filed the EEOC complaint constituted cause to find retaliation.1
6
Specifically, the EEOC found that the faculty members were
8. See Letter from Reuben Daniels, Jr., Dist. Dir., EEOC, to Belmont Abbey
College (July 30, 2009) [hereinafter Determination Letter] (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). The complaint focused only on contraception and did not include
the other exclusions from the College's benefits: abortion, vasectomies, and tubal
ligations. Id.
9. Jocelyn Fong, Conservative Blogs Falsely Claim Obama Is Forcing Catholic
College "To Cover Abortion," MEDIA MATTERS (Oct. 8, 2009, 12:39 PM),
http://mediamatters.org/research/2009/10/08/conservative-blogs-falsely-claim-obama-is-
forci/155500 (citing Determination Letter, supra note 8).
10. Id.
11. See Biography of Bill Thierfelder, BELMONT ABBEY COLL.,
http://www.belmontabbeycollege.edulpresident/pdflBillThierfelderbio.pdf (last visited
Feb. 24, 2013).
12. See Stripling, supra note 5 ("His somewhat nontraditional background has led to a




15. See Determination Letter, supra note 8; Fong, supra note 9.
16. See Stripling, supra note 5.
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exercising their legal right to file a claim with the EEOC. 7
Thierfelder's e-mail in response to the filing, the EEOC found, was
intended to produce a "chilling effect" on the campus and to create
an environment where faculty and staff would hesitate before filing
complaints against the College."
The religious discrimination claim was the only claim that the
EEOC found was unsupported by the evidence. 9 In its
Determination Letter, the EEOC stated that the contraceptive
"benefits were not changed based on each individual employee's
religious beliefs; contraception benefits were removed from the
health plan for all employees, regardless of religions." 0 Ironically, it
was the religious nature of the contraception dispute at the College
that received the most attention as a firestorm erupted in the media.2 1
Education forums, religion-focused blogs, and business publications
all weighed in on the debate, much of the coverage politicizing the
Determination Letter.22
The Belmont Abbey charges offer numerous lenses through
which to examine the legacy of Title VII jurisprudence and related
legislative actions and judicial decisions. Certainly, the religious
17. See id.
18. See id. ("Clearly, the president could have explained why the college was taking
contraception benefits out of its new employee health insurance policy without stating
each of your names as the persons who filed the charges." (quoting a March 5, 2009, letter
from Victoria Mackey, EEOC Senior Investigator, to the faculty members filing charges)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
19. Belmont Abbey does not require its employees to adhere to the Catholic Church's
tenets. See id.
20. Determination Letter, supra note 8; Fong, supra note 9 (quoting Determination
Letter).
21. That outpouring of attention to the religious discrimination portion of the charge
foreshadowed the related controversy during 2012 in which Catholic organizations decried
regulations pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (colloquially
known as "Obamacare"), which would have required some religious organizations to
provide coverage for reproductive health care, including contraceptives and sterilization.
See Contraception and Insurance Coverage (Religious Exemption Debate), N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/health/diseasesconditionsandhealthtopics/healthinsur
ance..andmanagedcare/health carereform/contraceptionlindex.html (last updated May
21, 2012). Thierfelder led Belmont Abbey to the forefront of that debate, filing a lawsuit
claiming that the regulations violated the First Amendment's free exercise clause. See Feds
Ask for Delay in Belmont Abbey College's Lawsuit Against HHS Mandate, CATH. NEWS
HERALD (Jan. 20, 2012, 1:34 PM), http://www.charlottediocese.org/n/features/53-
roknewspager-local/1338-belmont-abbey-colleges-lawsuit-continues-lawyers-call-hhs-
contraception-rule-a-coercive-action
22. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 5, at 381 n.13. Belmont Abbey proudly collected and
promoted the coverage. See Belmont Abbey College vs. EEOC, BELMONT ABBEY COLL.,
www.belmontabbeycollege.eduleeoc (last visited Jan. 26, 2013) (linking representative
media coverage of the EEOC's determination of discrimination).
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discrimination charge levied against a religious institution prompts a
nuanced interpretation of the basis for a religious exemption from
federal antidiscrimination statutes? The sex discrimination charge as
it relates to prescription contraceptives remains legally nebulous.2 4
However, as was indicated at the outset, the authors believe that the
most compelling legal lens through which to consider the Belmont
Abbey controversy is not the discrimination claims but the most
overlooked and final claim added to the charge-retaliation-which
has potential impact for employers (and their employees) of virtually
any type.
Clearly the faculty members identified in President Thierfelder's
e-mail and the EEOC diverged from the sentiments attributed to
Oscar Wilde and P.T. Barnum. They considered the publicity and talk
to which they were subjected to be negative on the whole. As a result,
the entire retaliation claim was based on Thierfelder's identification
of the eight charging parties, which raises the interesting question of
when "bad publicity" is bad enough to constitute unlawful retaliation.
Although notifying the Belmont Abbey community of changes in the
health care coverage or of concerns voiced by faculty regarding these
changes did not require an identification of the faculty involved in the
EEOC charge, presumably "naming names" should not always be a
viable basis for a retaliation claim. That might seem particularly
important when, as with the Belmont Abbey charge, many of the
faculty members involved were willing to speak to the media about
the claims. So when is disclosure of complainants' identities an
adverse action that supports a retaliation claim?
To be sure, filing an EEOC charge does not shroud those
involved in secrecy. The very intent of filing a charge is to commence
23. See Angela C. Carmella, Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1731,1734-35, 1743-44 (2011); Julie Manning Magid & Jamie Darin Prenkert, The
Religious and Associational Freedoms of Business Owners, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 191,
197 (2005); Ralph D. Mawdsley, Employment, Sexual Orientation, and Religious Beliefs:
Do Religious Educational Institutions Have a Protected Right to Discriminate in the
Selection and Discharge of Employees?, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 279, 279 (2011); Jamie
Darin Prenkert & Julie Manning Magid, A Hobson's Choice Model for Religious
Accommodation, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 506-10 (2006); Jamie Darin Prenkert, Liberty,
Diversity, Academic Freedom, and Survival: Preferential Hiring Among Religiously-
Affiliated Institutions of Higher Education, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1,7-8 (2004).
24. See, e.g., Cheryl A. Beckett, A Factor by Any Other Name: The Religious
Employer's Defense to Contraceptive Equity Claims Under the Equal Pay Act and Title
VII, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 18 (2009); Stephen F. Befort & Elizabeth C. Borer,
Equitable Prescription Drug Coverage: Preventing Sex Discrimination in Employer-
Provided Health Plans, 70 LA. L. REV. 205, 213 (2009); Julie Manning Magid,
Contraception and Contractions: A Divergent Decade Following Johnson Controls, 41 AM.
BUS. L.J. 115, 142 (2003).
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an investigation of a complaint, including disclosing the complaint to
the employer. Nevertheless, certain disclosures may constitute an
adverse action under Title VII jurisprudence if they are likely to have
the type of chilling effect on the enforcement of the
antidiscrimination laws that the EEOC contemplated. If so, what is
the standard for disclosure to assure it does not result in adverse
action?
This Article examines whether and in what circumstances an
employer's disclosure of the existence and identity of employees who
complain of discrimination should constitute an adverse action to
support a Title VII retaliation claim.25 Part I examines how the U.S.
Supreme Court significantly refined statutory retaliation doctrine in
recent years, most notably in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White.26 Part II then explores whether, in the context
of the Supreme Court's generally solicitous approach to retaliation
plaintiffs and the White standard for materially adverse actions,
existing statutory requirements, EEOC guidance, or retaliation case
law provides specific guidance as to whether disclosure by the
employer of the existence and identity of a complainant alleging
unlawful discrimination amounts to a materially adverse action under
Title VII. While each provides some clues as to how retaliatory
disclosure claims should be handled, there is no clear or emerging
doctrinal approach to be found in or among them. This doctrinal gap
is significant and implicates interests for employers and employees
alike. The lack of guidance from case law, legislation, and agency
requirements necessitates consideration of alternative sources of
guidance. Part III utilizes the stated rationale for anonymity and
pseudonymity in federal court litigation as well as social science
25. Although we focus our discussion on the Title VII retaliation claim, our analysis
would likely apply with equal force to retaliation claims under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 24 U.S.C. § 623 (2006), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203 (2006), the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (2006), the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006), and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006), all of which have language that is identical or
similar enough in relevant respects to Title VII to incorporate White's "materially adverse
action" standard, discussed infra Part II. See Alex P. Long, Employment Retaliation and
the Accident of Text, 90 OR. L. REV. 525, 546-47 (2011). Our analysis probably has little
reach beyond those statutes. As Professor Alex Long explains, statutory provisions
governing employment retaliation claims-though multitudinous-are wildly divergent.
See id. While Part I discusses the Supreme Court's general approach to statutory
retaliation claims, for purposes of clarity and readability, we are careful to confine our
specific discussion in the remaining parts to Title VII, with the understanding that it has
some application outside that context.
26. 548 U.S. 53, 53-55 (2006).
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research examining the motivations of whistleblowers as perspectives
to inform the discussion. Part IV then offers a framework concerning
when disclosure of complainants' identities constitutes an adverse
action. The framework identifies two types of retaliatory disclosure:
primary (when the disclosure itself involves such a sensitive issue that
it is retaliatory all on its own) and secondary (when disclosure is
retaliatory because it increases the likelihood that the complainant
will suffer other types of retribution). Part V identifies a prescriptive
balance-a "need to know" standard-that considers the interests of
both employers and employees in retaliatory disclosure claims. The
Article concludes by noting that the proposed framework is flexible
enough to accommodate those interests, while providing much-
needed guidance that is currently lacking in the Title VII retaliation
doctrine.
I. RETALIATION'S EMERGENCE AND EXPANSION
Congress understood the risks associated with employees
exercising their rights against discrimination in the workplace at the
time of Title VII's passage.27 Section 704 of Title VII prohibits
employer retaliation against employees who enforce their
antidiscrimination rights.? Using intentionally broad language, this
provision protects employee conduct.2 9 It grants to employees
freedom from interference by employers while pursuing the
guarantee of equality in the workplace. 0 Since its passage, however,
the broad language has required repeated refinement by the federal
courts."
27. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat.
241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (2006)).
28. Section 704 provides, in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment ... because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
29. White, 548 U.S. at 64 ("Thus, purpose reinforces what language already indicates,
namely, that the antiretaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited
to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.").
30. Id. at 63.
31. See id. at 59-62; Ashley R. Wright, Note, An Ambiguous Clarification: How
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White's Resolution of Circuit Split Creates
Uncertainty in the Eighth Circuit, 61 ARK. L. REV. 161, 168-74 (2008) (summarizing
various approaches taken by circuit courts interpreting Title VIIs antiretaliation
provisions).
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A. Retaliation Claims on the Rise
Charges of retaliation rose 105% between fiscal years 1997 and
2011.32 And, as a proportion of all claims filed with the EEOC,
retaliation claims rose to fifteen percent, while other types of claims
either decreased of remained at the same percentage of the total.3
The most significant jump occurred between 2006 and 2007-
following the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Burlington Northern
& Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White-when the number of retaliation
charges leapt nearly twenty percent in a single year."
The reason for the spike in retaliation claims is somewhat
unclear. Some attribute the rise to an actual increase in retaliation,
while others point to the experience of employees and the plaintiffs'
bar that retaliation claims are often successful even when the
underlying discrimination claim is dismissed.35 Still others opine that
judges and juries might be less likely to believe allegations of
discrimination while " 'every[one] ... who has ever worked
understands retaliation,' " making it a desirable route of recovery. 6
As described below," the holding in White could be read to reinforce
each of these latter two explanations, making it easier to succeed on
retaliation claims and confirming the belief that retaliation is more
frequent than discrimination. Regardless of the root causes, the
onslaught of retaliation charges reportedly has left employers feeling
"paralyzed" when dealing with employee misconduct after
advancement of a discrimination complaint."
32. EEOC Charge Statistics, FY 1997 to FY 2011, U.S. EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
33. See Adam J. Bernstein, Note, Retaliatory Litigation Conduct After Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company v. White, 42 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 91, 114-
15 (2008).
34. Id.
35. See Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis
of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 663,
690-91 (speculating about the reasons for the rise in retaliation charges); Joan M. Savage,
Note, Adopting the EEOC Deterrence Approach to the Adverse Employment Action Prong
in a Prima Facie Case for Title VII Retaliation, 46 B.C. L. REV. 215, 216 (2004) ("Plaintiffs
find that they can recover on a retaliation claim even when the court dismisses their
underlying claim. Retaliation claims have been successful with juries . . . .").
36. Bernstein, supra note 33, at 114 (quoting Marcia Coyle, Retaliation Cases Hit High
Court En Masse: Justices to Review Trio of Key Cases, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 28, 2008, at 1).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 56-67.




B. Retaliation Claims and the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's docket has reflected retaliation's growth
trend. The Court heard at least one statutory retaliation claim each
year from 2008 through 2011.11 The leading case interpreting Title
VII's antiretaliation provision is the Court's opinion in White.40
To state a prima facie claim of retaliation under Title VII, a
plaintiff must offer evidence that (1) she has engaged in a protected
activity under the law, (2) she was subjected to an adverse action, and
(3) there is a causal connection between the two.4 1 No claim can
survive, then, without alleging and proving that the employer
subjected the claimant to some act that rises to the level of adversity
contemplated under Title VII.42 In the years leading up to White, a
split emerged among the circuits as to exactly what kind of adverse
action could anchor a retaliation claim under Title VII. 43
This controversy focused on the relative badness of the action
and on its proximity to the employment relationship. Some circuits
defined employer actions required for a retaliation claim narrowly,
allowing plaintiffs to bring such a claim based only on an allegedly
retaliatory "ultimate employment decision[]," like hiring, firing, and
promotion." Some circuits applied in the retaliation context the
"adverse action" standard generally governing the discrimination
provision of Title VII, which permits a plaintiff to base a claim on
only an adverse employment action-that is, one affecting an
39. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1325
(2011) (claim pursuant to Fair Labor Standards Act); Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP,
131 S. Ct. 863, 867 (2010) (claim pursuant to Title VII); Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of
Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 278-80 (2009) (claim pursuant to Title VII);
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008) (claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (2006)); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 477 (2008) (claims pursuant to the
federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
40. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
41. See Lebofsky v. City of Phila., 394 F. App'x 935, 938 (3d Cir. 2010).
42. See, e.g., Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 474-75 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding
plaintiff's claim deficient for failure to advance allegations of a materially adverse action),
cert. granted on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 23 (2012).
43. See White, 548 U.S. at 59-62.
44. See, e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding
that hostility from fellow employees, stolen tools, and anxiety are not ultimate
employment decisions); Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997)
("Absent evidence of some more tangible change in duties or working conditions that
constituted a material employment disadvantage, we must agree with the district court
that [plaintiffs] did not present evidence sufficient to demonstrate any adverse
employment action that constitutes the sort of ultimate employment decision intended to
be actionable under Title VIL").
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individual's benefits, terms, or conditions of employment.4 5 Still other
circuits held that any materially adverse action-even one not
substantially altering employment-might be the basis of a valid Title
VII retaliation claim.46
White gave the Supreme Court the chance to resolve the circuit
split. In 1997, Burlington Northern hired plaintiff White as a track
laborer in its Tennessee yard, where she was the only woman in the
company's Maintenance of Way department.4 7 After White was
assigned to assume some forklift operation tasks, she reported to the
company roadmaster that her immediate supervisor repeatedly
complained to her that women should not be assigned to the
department and that he made inappropriate comments to her in front
of male colleagues." The company suspended the supervisor and
required him to attend additional training,4 but in the same
conversation in which the higher-ranking roadmaster informed White
of the supervisor's discipline, he also told her that she would be
transferred from her forklift duties so that a " 'more senior man' "
could perform that " 'less arduous and cleaner job.' "I A short time
later, when the supervisor about whom White complained reported
that White had been insubordinate, the roadmaster suspended her."
Consequently, she filed an internal grievance. White was cleared of
the insubordination allegation through the company's internal
procedure, and she was awarded back pay for the suspension, which
in the end totaled thirty-seven days.s2
45. See, e.g., Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 617 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting
plaintiffs retaliation claim for lack of adverse action where "acts [plaintiff] complainted]
of ultimately had no effect on [plaintiff's] employment status"); Von Gunten v. Maryland,
243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) ("What is necessary in all ... retaliation cases is evidence
that the challenged discriminatory acts or harassment adversely effected [sic] 'the terms,
conditions, or benefits' of the plaintiff's employment." (citing Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of
N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 242 (4th Cir. 1997))).
46. See, e.g., Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co., 183 F.3d 598, 606 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining
that retaliation claims might anchor on adverse actions "not ostensibly employment
related"); Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding an
adverse action in an employer's cancellation of an awards ceremony honoring the plaintiff,
following the plaintiffs allegation of discrimination); Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc.,
891 F.2d 1527, 1532 (11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting defendant's theory that plaintiff's
retaliation claim must be anchored on an employment action related to the employment
relationship with the defendant and finding that the alleged act of convincing subsequent
employer to terminate plaintiff's subsequent employment amounted to adverse action).
47. White, 548 U.S. at 57.
48. Id. at 58.
49. Id
50. Id. (quoting the lower court's opinion, 364 F.3d 789,792 (6th Cir. 2004)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 58-59.
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White brought a Title VII retaliation claim against Burlington
based on her suspension and the transfer of her duties away from the
forklift. A jury found in her favor.13 The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals initially reversed the decision but later affirmed the district
court in an en banc opinion.' The judges on the en banc panel
disagreed amongst themselves, however, as to the standard to apply
to the adverse action prong of White's retaliation claim."
On appeal, the Supreme Court adopted the broadest view
accepted in the circuit courts. To be "actionable" under Title VII's
antiretaliation provisions, the Court explained, an employer's action
need not be employment related, nor must it even happen in the
workplace.s" Rather, an employer's retaliatory act is actionable under
Title VII when it is materially adverse to an employee or applicant,
meaning that the "actions must be harmful to the point that they
could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination."57
The Court's decision was based on two lines of reasoning. First,
construing the plain language of the statute and comparing the
antidiscrimination and antiretaliation provisions, the Court thought it
most reasonable to interpret the retaliation protections more broadly.
While Title VII's antidiscrimination provision, by its terms, limits its
application to hiring, firing, compensation, and other "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment,"" the antiretaliation
provision applies no such restriction. 9 Second, and significantly, to
limit the scope of the antiretaliation provision of Title VII merely to
work-related actions would not fully serve the purpose of deterring
discrimination and retaliation. To do so might permit employers to
otherwise deter employees from exercising their rights under Title
VII. For example, an employee who understands that the result of
filing a charge of sexual harassment (or even complaining about
harassment) is that she will be fired in retaliation for the charge or
complaint will not likely file the charge or complaint in the first place.
Thus, the antiretaliation provision critically supports the
53. Id. at 59.
54. See White v. Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Railway Co., 364 F. 3d 789, 791
(2004) (en banc decision).
55. White, 548 U.S. at 59.
56. Id. at 57.
57. Id.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
59. White, 548 U.S. at 62-63 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), -3(a)).
60. Id. at 63-64.
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antidiscrimination provision."1 Without the former, there can be no,
or significantly less, enforcement of the latter.6 2 Accordingly, the
Court reasoned that applying the retaliation provision to actions both
within and outside of the workplace would best preserve access to
Title VII's protective mechanisms.6 3
This does not mean that every action an employee finds
unpleasant, rude, or annoying is automatically an "adverse action"
within Title VII jurisprudence. Rather, to be actionable, the adversity
must be material, not trivial.' The standard is context-specific;s some
actions in some circumstances might not be materially adverse-
meaning they would not deter the reasonable worker from pursuing
his rights under Title VII-but they might nonetheless be so in other
circumstances." Given the circumstances facing White, the Court
reasoned that a reasonable jury could have found that the transfer of
her duties and the suspension without pay-regardless of whether the
pay was restored-were materially adverse as contemplated by Title
VII.67
In the years since White, courts have continued to struggle to
parse prevailing thresholds regarding what does and does not amount
to a "materially adverse action" on which a Title VII retaliation claim
may be based.68 A unified and consistent doctrine has not emerged.
The circuit and district courts have continued to struggle with the
application of the materially adverse action standard, including
determining whether and under what conditions reassignment of
duties, 9 social isolation, 0 investigation of the complainant's own
61. This sentiment has animated much of the Supreme Court's antiretaliation
jurisprudence in the last decade. See, e.g., Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 481 (2008)
(finding that the federal-sector provision of the ADEA prohibits retaliation despite the
absence of an express prohibition); CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 453-55
(2008) (finding that § 1981 prohibits retaliation despite the absence of an express
prohibition); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005) (finding that
Title IX prohibits retaliation despite the absence of an express prohibition).
62. White, 548 U.S. at 67.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 68.
65. Id. at 69 ("Context matters.").
66. Id. at 69-70.
67. Id. at 70.
68. See Emily White, Note, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White:
The Supreme Court Bolsters Worker Protections by Setting Broad Retaliation Test, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 530, 535 (2007) (noting that the White "test opens up more
issues of fact for juries or judgest to consider, such as materiality and how the conduct
would influence a reasonable person").
69. Compare Lucero v. Nettle Creek Sch. Corp., 566 F.3d 720, 728-30 (7th Cir. 2010)
(holding that no reasonable employee would find a transfer of teaching responsibilities
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conduct," or criticism and oral counseling7 2 might qualify.
The Supreme Court, for its part, has tacitly affirmed the breadth
of its holding in White. In Thompson v. North American Stainless,
LP,13 the Court examined whether an employer's firing of Thompson,
the fianc6 of a woman who filed a complaint of discrimination,
constituted a cognizable claim of retaliation by Thompson.74 It found
that the broad interpretation of antiretaliation demanded such a
finding because "a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from
engaging in protected activity" if she were aware an employer would
take action against a third party.75
Nonetheless, no consistent jurisprudence has emerged as to
from twelfth-grade English to seventh-grade English to be materially adverse), with
Billings v. Town of Grafton, 515 F.3d 39, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that plaintiff
presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment that her transfer to a less
desirable position was materially adverse), and Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 347
(3d Cir. 2006) (holding that "a jury could consider [plaintiffs] transfer to be a materially
adverse action").
70. Compare Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding any
isolation of the plaintiff was not retaliatory because all communication officers were
equally isolated), and Lytle v. JPMorgan Chase, No. 08-Civ.-9503, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15599 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2012) (finding no materially adverse action was taken against the
plaintiff), with Freytes-Torres v. City of Sanford, 270 F. App'x 885, 894 (11th Cir. 2008)
(holding that defendant's "ostracization" of the plaintiff was "not substantial and just the
sort of 'petty slight' that is not actionable under White").
71. Compare Billings, 515 F.3d at 46 (holding that investigation into the plaintiffs
unauthorized opening of a letter was not retaliatory), with Smith v. Harvey, 265 F. App'x
197, 201-02 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding no material adversity in an employer requiring the
plaintiff to explain an unusually high telephone bill), and Weger, 500 F.3d at 727 (finding
that requiring performance evaluations was not adverse action).
72. See Delgado-O'Neil v. City of Minneapolis, 745 F. Supp. 2d 894, 903 (D. Minn.
2010) ("In the context of a retaliation claim, verbal reprimands or coaching alone do not
constitute the type of significant harm that would deter a reasonable employee from
engaging in protected activity."). But see Blue v. IBEW, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1017 (W.D.
Wis. 2010) (holding that criticism may constitute a materially adverse action where
plaintiff has never before been criticized or verbally reprimanded).
73. 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011) (noting that the Court had held in White "that Title
VII's antiretaliation provision must be construed to cover a broad range of employer
conduct").
74. The question presented to the Court was whether Thompson could pursue a claim
under Title VII, even though he personally had not engaged in opposition or participation
conduct as required by the antiretaliation provision of Title VII. Id. at 867. The Court
determined he was a "person aggrieved" by a violation of Title VII and could, thus, pursue
a claim in his own right. Id. at 870. The violation was the retaliatory conduct directed at his
fiancde, Regalado. Thompson's firing was understood by the Court as a materially adverse
action against Regalado in retaliation for her protected activity, in that the termination of
someone that close to her was likely to deter a reasonable employee from making a charge
of discrimination. Id. at 867 ("[W]e have little difficulty concluding that if the facts alleged
by Thompson are true, then [the employer's] firing of Thompson violated Title VII.").
75. Id. at 868.
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whether disclosure by the employer of the existence and identity of a
complainant alleging unlawful discrimination amounts to a materially
adverse action. This doctrinal gap is significant and implicates
interests for employers and employees alike. Employees may view as
very important the extent to which their complaints and identities are
not widely publicized. They may fear reprisal from specific
individuals, including both supervisors and coworkers. They may feel
shame or embarrassment at the treatment directed toward them, may
wish simply to keep a low profile at work and not face being the
center of a controversy, or may have other reasons for keeping
private their complaints. If so, employer disclosure, or the threat of it,
might well dissuade a reasonable employee from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination under those circumstances. By
the same token, some employees may wish to make public their
allegations, perhaps hoping that the court of public opinion will assist
them in advancing their claims or obtaining a settlement, or they may
wish to make the public aware of what they rightly or wrongly
perceive as injustice. 6
Likewise, employers may have varying interests relating to the
confidentiality of discrimination allegations. Employers may wish to
keep complaints confidential to avoid disrupting the workplace, to
preserve their public image, or to avoid encouraging copycat claims
against them. They may, however, sometimes have interests in
addressing such claims publicly, such as to refute a commonly known
claim, to report to shareholders or other stakeholders, or to make
public what they believe to be their own subjection to injustice.7
More pragmatically, employers must often conduct investigations of
discrimination complaints against them, regardless of whether the
complaints emerge internally or through the filing of a charge of
76. Indeed, charging parties will from time to time hold a press conference on the
EEOC's steps after filing a charge. See, e.g., PMac, Warehouse Workers to File
Discrimination Charges with EEOC Against DB Schenker, COPYLINE NEWS MAG. (Apr.
28, 2011), http://www.copylinemagazine.cominews/2011/04/28/warehouse-workers-to-file-
discrimination-charges-with-eeoc-against-db-schenker/.
77. Hooters and Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing have both famously-and with
dramatically differing results-attempted to capitalize on public sentiment in fighting
charges of discrimination. See Kenneth L. Schneyer, Hooting: Public and Popular
Discourse About Sex Discrimination, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 551, 567-68 (1998) (noting
Hooters' public relations campaign in response to sex discrimination claims); Stephen
Braun, Workers Protest Harassment Suit Against Mitsubishi, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1996, at
Dl, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1996-04-23/business/fi-61695_1_sexual-
harassment (describing Mitsubishi's corporate-sponsored employee protests at the
EEOC's offices in Chicago).
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discrimination at the EEOC.7 8
The Belmont Abbey case falls in this doctrinal gap and
demonstrates potentially competing interests of employers and
employees. As previously noted, the President of the College singled
out by name faculty members filing EEOC claims against the College
based on a change in health care coverage of prescription
contraception.79 Although the employees added a retaliation claim to
the EEOC filing, several of them discussed the matter openly with
press and Internet bloggers."0
Given the substantial and often competing interests that are at
play in disclosure situations, in the next Part we analyze the statutory,
regulatory, and case law to determine if existing positive law provides
sufficient guidance to delineate the boundaries of a retaliatory
disclosure claim.
II. EXISTING DOCTRINE AND RETALIATORY DISCLOSURE
Though the authors have coined the term "retaliatory
disclosure," this Article started from the point of view that it is
possible that existing legal doctrine provides sufficient guidance as to
the materiality of adversity posed by the disclosure of a complainant's
identity. This Article finds, though, that it does not. In this Part, it
first looks to the statutory requirement of confidentiality of the
EEOC charge process to determine whether the requirement
provides direct or analogous authority to regulate disclosure. Finding
that the confidentiality requirements are not directly applicable, this
Article then looks to EEOC guidance documents for direction. The
guidance documents are interesting but not directly on point; thus,
this Article turns to retaliation case law to see how courts have
handled disclosure claims in the past. Again, no clear doctrinal path
emerges.
A. The Statute and EEOC Guidance
The issue of retaliatory disclosure would be easily enough
78. See infra Part II.A.2.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
80. For example, Dr. David Neipert, one of the charging parties and then-former
faculty at Belmont Abbey, authored a guest post for the Baltimore Sun explaining his
perspective on the controversy. Neipert's piece refuted criticisms of the case and added
additional information about the circumstances and dynamics of communications at
Belmont Abbey out of which the charges arose. David Neipert, Guest Post: Another View
on Belmont Abbey, BALT. SUN (Oct. 19, 2009), http://weblogs.baltimoresun.comlnews
ifaith/2009/10/guest-post anotherview_on bel.html.
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resolved if Title VII or EEOC regulations dealt directly with the
responsibility of the parties to keep charge information confidential.
Neither the statute nor agency guidance contemplates retaliatory
disclosure specifically. What emerges from a review of both, however,
is a picture of a process that is neither wholly private nor wholly
public. Congress was clearly concerned with protecting the charge
and conciliation process from public disclosure by the EEOC and its
agents. But those requirements do not directly regulate the parties to
the complaint. Moreover, EEOC guidance contemplates and
encourages disclosure in some circumstances.
1. Statutory Provisions
Title VII itself compels the EEOC to keep information regarding
the details of a claim of discrimination or retaliation confidential from
public view, stating:
Charges shall not be made public by the Commission . . . . If the
Commission determines after such investigation that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the
Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done
during and as a part of such informal endeavors may be made
public by the Commission, its officers or employees, or used as
evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written
consent of the persons concerned. Any person who makes
public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year,
or both.'
Courts have opined that this duty of confidentiality is twofold.
The first requirement prohibits the Commission from publicizing an
unproven charge,82 while the second imposes broader limits on the
disclosure of information gathered in the conciliation process.83 The
first, contrary to the interests implicated in a retaliatory disclosure
claim, contemplates protection of the employer's interest in its
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006).
82. See Branch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 F.2d 873, 879 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The [first
confidentiality requirement] is not intended to hamper Commission investigations or
proper cooperation with other State and Federal agencies, but rather is aimed at the
making available to the general public of unproven charges."); H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC,
472 F.2d 1147, 1150 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 12723 (1964) (statement of
Sen. Humphrey)).
83. See EEOC v. Philip Servs. Corp., 635 F.3d 164, 165 (5th Cir. 2011).
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reputation as the motive for confidentiality. Indeed, charging parties
will often try to use public pressure by disclosing the charge details;'
however, Title VII makes clear that the EEOC cannot be complicit in
the public airing of the details underlying the charge. The duty of
confidentiality with respect to conciliation agreements is so powerful
that at least one court has found that a breach of contract proceeding
to enforce an oral conciliation agreement could not continue, with the
importance of the confidentiality provision outweighing interest in
the enforcement.a5 And these nondisclosure provisions specifically
exempt the information gained by the EEOC in its investigation and
conciliation efforts from public release under the Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA"). 6 The fact that the confidentiality of the
information gained in the process outweighs the otherwise strong
preference for transparency in government activity further
underscores the depth of concern Congress had for protecting the
sanctity and nonpublic nature of the charge process.
Regardless of how serious a duty this provision imposes on the
EEOC, several courts have rejected the application of this provision
to impose confidentiality constraints on employers." Additionally,
several courts have opined that the provision was aimed at providing
employers a "modicum of protection" for their confidential
information and at encouraging conciliation and voluntary resolution
by the parties." While this provision appears not to place on
employers the same duty of silence imposed on the EEOC, it does
little to answer whether disclosure can amount to retaliation.
The existence of the provision itself may indicate statutory intent
to protect the privacy of the charging party, yet it applies to the
privacy of both parties. As evidenced by the few courts that have
opined on the intent of the provision, it may in fact be more indicative
of a policy in favor of mediation and voluntary resolution than of
privacy protection for any one person or entity involved in a charge.8 9
84. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
85. See Branch, 638 F.2d at 879-83.
86. See Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 722 F. Supp. 180, 182 (D.N.J. 1989).
87. See Whitaker v. Carney, 778 F.2d 216, 221-22 (5th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Phillip
Servs. Corp., Civ. Action No. H-09-1625, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18296, at *8 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 6, 2010).
88. See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 192 (1990); Whitaker, 778 F.2d at 222.
89. See Branch, 638 F.2d at 880-81 ("[I]t is clear that Congress placed great emphasis
upon private settlement and the elimination of unfair practices without litigation on the
ground that voluntary compliance is preferable to court action. Indeed, it is apparent that
the primary role of the EEOC is to seek elimination of unlawful employment practices by
informal means leading to voluntary compliance.").
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2. Agency Guidance
Similarly, other EEOC guidance offers little indication as to
whether disclosure is an adverse action. The EEOC has issued no
regulations or guidance documents directly on point. There are,
however, a couple of ancillary guidance documents that are relevant
but that fail to provide a sufficient basis upon which to craft a
complete account of retaliatory disclosure.
First, the EEOC's approach to disclosure of charge files pursuant
to FOIA" reflects the statute's treatment of charge information as
quasi-private." Section 83 of the EEOC Compliance Manual'
implements the EEOC's regulations regarding rules that apply to the
disclosure of charge files.13 The regulations state that "[u]nder
sections 706 and 709 [of Title VII], case files involved in the
administrative process of the Commission are not available to the
public."9 4 Thus, the files are exempted from FOIA's disclosure
requirements." Nevertheless, there are special disclosure rules that
apply to the charging party, a person aggrieved upon whose behalf a
charge has been filed, and entities against whom a charge has been
filed. 6 Compliance Manual section 83 provides those special
disclosure rules. It states that providing such parties the file is not
"making public" the file as prohibited by the statute and regulations.
Those parties can submit a written request for the file,98 in which case
the EEOC will sanitize the file of otherwise confidential information99
and disclose it. However, such parties once again become members of
the public and, as such, are not entitled to disclosure when their
notice of right to sue has lapsed without filing a complaint based on
90. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (requiring federal agencies to make
information available to the public upon request).
91. See supra Part II.A.1.
92. 1 U.S. EEOC, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 83 (2000), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foialsection83.cfm.
93. 29 C.F.R. § 1610.17 (2012).
94. Id. § 1610.17(d).
95. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1610.17(a).
96. 29 C.F.R. § 1610.17(d).
97. 1 U.S. EEOC, supra note 92, § 83.
98. Id. § 83.2.
99. Id. § 83.4 (including in the list of nondisclosable information attorney work
product, intra-agency and interagency memoranda, information about related charges,
settlement and conciliation records, sensitive medical information, confidential
commercial information, and confidential witness information). The Compliance Manual
also indicates that the identity of a party on whose behalf a charge has been filed should
be removed from any disclosure. Id. § 83.4(g). This instruction is only for those charging




the charge in federal court.1" Thus, as in the statute, the Compliance
Manual makes clear that the EEOC may not be the source of
disclosure to the public; however, the strong interest of certain parties
in information related to the charge overrides even the general
requirement of confidentiality imposed on the EEOC.
Second, the EEOC has interpreted Supreme Court precedent to
encourage, if not require, some limited disclosure in certain
circumstances. Yet this guidance does not justify all disclosures.
Under Title VII jurisprudence, an employer can avoid vicarious
liability for otherwise unlawful discrimination by showing (1) it
exercised reasonable care to promptly prevent and correct any
sexually harassing behavior and (2) the plaintiff unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or otherwise to avoid harm.'Go One might
suppose that, at least with respect to internal complaints of
discrimination, cases interpreting this defense, commonly referred to
as the Faragher/Ellerth defense, might yield insight on an employer's
duty to keep confidential employee complaints of discrimination. Yet
no consensus exists.
The EEOC's enforcement guidance documents indeed
recommend that an employer's antidiscrimination and reporting
policies require confidentiality,102 but these recommendations are not
legally binding on employers. The Second Circuit has held that a
company's antidiscrimination policy need not require confidentiality
to meet the requirements of the Faragher/Ellerth defense.'"
"Indeed," the court noted, "it is hard to imagine how a company
could keep a complaint confidential and also conduct a fair and
thorough investigation."" Yet opinions from other courts indicate
that some kind of confidentiality guarantee might be required for the
100. Id. § 83.3.
101. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775,807 (1998).
102. E.g., U.S. EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER
LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS (1999), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html; see also Arnie v. City of Jennings, No.
2:03-CV-2011, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36875, at *6 (W.D. La. July 15, 2005) (noting that
ensuring confidentiality is one preventative action employers can take to avoid harassment
charges from employees).
103. See Finnerty v. William H. Sadlier, Inc., 176 F. App'x 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2006)
(citing Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 2001)) ("We have never
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employer to stand under the Faragher/Ellerth umbrella.0 5 In a 2007
case, a district court declined to grant summary judgment on
Faragher/Ellerth immunity on the grounds that the supervisor
receiving a complaint failed to maintain confidentiality, disclosed the
complaint to the alleged discriminator immediately after it was filed,
and questioned the complainant within earshot of the alleged
discriminator.'06 Another court found that evidence of a failure to
provide confidentiality for internal complaints might indicate that the
employer's policy is not protective enough to satisfy the
Faragher/Ellerth demands.'0 The inclusion of a provision
guaranteeing confidentiality to the extent practical for conducting an
effective investigation has been found to meet the defense's
requirements of reasonableness, however.'08 Accordingly, while the
cases seem to favor the preservation of confidentiality as encouraged
in the EEOC guidance, there is not a consensus among courts as to
the requirement of such a guarantee, and several seem to observe that
an effective investigation-also required by the guidance-at the very
least requires some disclosure of the details of a complaint of
discrimination.
Thus, the agency guidance does not provide sufficient direction
for defining the parameters of a retaliatory disclosure claim. We next
turn to the retaliation case law for assistance.
B. Case Law on Disclosure
Because the statute and agency guidance do not provide
sufficient direction to build a doctrine of retaliatory disclosure, this
Article turns to the case law interpreting Title VII's antiretaliation
mandate to determine whether there are emerging themes through
which to build a coherent framework or analysis of retaliatory
disclosure. This is done by looking first to the pre-White case law,
both for the purpose of completeness and with the understanding that
it may be of limited value due to the shift White ushered in. Cases
decided by the lower courts since the Supreme Court opinion in
White are also considered, but are no more helpful.
105. See, e.g., Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 646 (7th Cir. 2000) (Wood, J.,
dissenting).
106. See EEOC v. Smokin' Joe's Tobacco Shop, Inc., No. 06-01758, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 31512, at *24--26 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30,2007).
107. See Lake v. AK Steel Corp., No. 2:03cv517, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25118, at *159-
60 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2006).
108. See Myers v. Croell Ready Mix, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 889, 915 (N.D. Iowa 2009).
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1. Pre-White Cases Addressing Whether Disclosure Is Actionable
The majority of courts considering retaliatory disclosure claims
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in White found that the action
in question was not sufficient to be the basis for a retaliation claim.
In several cases, the courts' decisions were transparently based
on antiquated pre-White standards regarding whether a claim is
actionable under Title VII. For example, in Hudson v. Tahoe Crystal
Bay, Inc.,"o' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a plaintiff's
retaliation claim based on the alleged breach of confidentiality
regarding her internal complaint of discrimination. 10 The court held
that because the alleged breach of confidentiality "did not result in a
termination, demotion, reduction in salary ... nor in any material
change in terms and conditions of employment," it could not amount
to an adverse action on which to base a successful retaliation claim."'
The employment-specific language indicated the court's adherence to
a much narrower standard than that articulated by the Supreme
Court in White.
A similar result ensued in the case of Mintzmyer v. Babbitt.112
Following a bench trial on the plaintiff's employment discrimination
and retaliation claims, the District Court for the District of Columbia
rejected the theory that disclosure of a confidential internal complaint
of discrimination could anchor an actionable Title VII retaliation
claim.113 The plaintiff, a decorated and successful regional director for
the National Park Service, filed an allegation of discrimination with
the Park Service under both Title VII and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, claiming that the deputy director of the Agency
discriminated against her unlawfully.114 Mintzmyer alleged that after
she filed her complaint, the deputy director met with a friend of the
plaintiff who previously worked for the Agency and who-at the time
of the meeting with the deputy director-was working as a staff
member for the Majority on the House Subcommittee on Parks and
Insular Affairs, which was responsible for funding allocation to the
Parks Service."' During the meeting, the deputy director informed
the plaintiff's friend of the plaintiff's complaint and asked her to
109. No. 98-17023, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20881 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 1999).
110. See id. at *6-7.
111. Id. at *7.
112. No. 93-0773(GK), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1182, at *56 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 1995)
(rejecting an employee's claim for retaliation).
113. Id. at *55-56.
114. Id. at *1-3, *30.
115. Id. at *17-18.
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appeal to the plaintiff to resolve the complaint without involving an
attorney in the negotiations.11 6 The friend then did as the deputy
director supposedly requested, meeting with Mintzmyer shortly after
and relaying the deputy director's offer: Mintzmyer could contact the
director of the agency and could obtain a higher position at the Park
Service if she informally resolved the complaint."' She was
embarrassed by this exchange. 118 And, worse, when she took the offer
and contacted the director to pursue her position, she discovered that
the director had no knowledge of the proposed agreement. 11
Mintzmyer brought several claims against the Park Service,
among them that the disclosure by the deputy director of her
confidential discrimination complaint to her congressional staffer
friend constituted unlawful retaliation under Title VII.120 The court
declined to find that such a disclosure could be serious enough to
amount to retaliation. However "professionally embarrass[ing]" and
"improper," the disclosure led to no actual adverse employment
action against plaintiff at the Park Service. 12' The Mintzmyer opinion
clearly relied on an elevated, pre-White adverse action standard of
retaliation that required a much greater connection between the
alleged wrong and the plaintiff's employment than the standard
articulated by the Supreme Court in White. Given the court's
acknowledgment of the wrongful and embarrassing nature of the
disclosure, it may today find the opposite under the materially
adverse action standard laid out in White.
Numerous other cases do not specifically mention a higher
standard than the one announced in White; however, in all but one
pre-White case, courts rejected the theory that disclosure of one's
discrimination complaint was a valid basis for a retaliation claim. We
discuss the cases that reject the theory first, followed by the
exception.
In Dunn v. Washington County Hospital,'2 2 the plaintiff, a nurse
in a public hospital, brought an action alleging that her employer was
liable for sexual harassment and retaliation against her by an
independent contractor physician with whom she worked.12' Among
116. Id. at *17.
117. Id. at *17-18.
118. Id. at *18.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *53.
121. Id. at *55-56.
122. 429 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2005).
123. Id. at 689-90.
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the nurse's complaints were that the physician harassed her in
retaliation for complaining about his behavior, meaning that he was
made aware of her complaints in a manner that did not protect her.124
While the majority found no actionable wrong in her averments,
Judge Rovner dissented, noting that after the plaintiff and other
nurses complained, they submitted to interviews by the hospital's
counsel. 12s They each expressed concern about the damage their
complaints could do to their relationship with the hospital and the
physician, and each was assured confidentiality.'2 6 Yet it was not long,
the dissent explained, before the hospital turned the nurses'
statements over to the physician, who taunted the plaintiff, telling
her, for example, that "paybacks are hell."127 Given these
circumstances, Judge Rovner would have found that the disclosure of
the complaints and the identity of those complaining could constitute
sufficient action on which to base a retaliation claim within the
purview of Title VII.12 8
In Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp.,' a plaintiff engineer
brought a sexual harassment charge against his employer based on
alleged discrimination by a female technician. When the company did
not resolve the matter to his satisfaction, he filed an EEOC charge.13 0
The company published a short article about the charge in its internal
company news digest. 3' The plaintiff eventually brought a slew of
claims alleging, among other things, that the company retaliated
against him by publishing the article disclosing his charge and
identity.'32 While the EEOC found cause for the retaliation claim, the
district court rejected it on the grounds that the article was truthful.3
3
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the company, but omitted substantive discussion on the
merits of the retaliation claim."
Notably, at least one court has commented that the disclosure of
an EEOC charge of discrimination to the accused's supervisor cannot
124. Id. at 690.
125. Id. at 694 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 698.
127. Id. at 697 (quoting 2004 Dunn Deposition at 251-52, Dunn v. Washington Cnty.
Hosp., 429 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. Id. at 696-97.
129. 759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1985).
130. Id. at 357.
131. Id.
132, Id. at 357-58.
133. Id. at 359-60.
134. Id. at 363.
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warrant a breach of confidentiality rising to the level of an actionable
adverse action under Title VII, stating that such disclosure is "an
integral part of the disciplinary process."' To the extent that the
foregoing cases are based not on a faulty standard but instead on this
kind of practical rationale, they may be relevant to post-White
jurisprudence.' 36 The reasoning in these cases on the point of whether
disclosure amounts to actionable retaliation is minimal, however. It is
difficult to discern the extent to which those opinions relied on a now-
defunct and exceedingly high adverse action standard.
In the sole pre-White case to find disclosure of a complaint could
constitute an actionable retaliatory action under Title VII, Lafate v.
Chase Manhattan Bank,"' the court declined to set aside a verdict in
favor of a Title VII retaliation plaintiff alleging, among other things,
that her employer unnecessarily disclosed details of her EEOC
charge.a3 The plaintiff filed a charge after being denied a promotion
to which she believed she was entitled.' 9 She eventually filed a suit
alleging retaliation as well, and a jury found in her favor.140 The trial
court rejected the employer's argument that the plaintiff failed to
offer evidence sufficient to demonstrate an adverse action under Title
VII's retaliation framework.14' By moving the employee to a less
comfortable workspace, assigning her a task she was untrained to
complete, and "most importantly," 4 2 by filing plaintiff's EEOC
charges in her personnel file, an act that gave four of her managers
access to the documents, the employer had, indeed, committed a
materially adverse employment action on which a Title VII
retaliation claim could be based.143 By grouping these allegations
together, the court's decision left some ambiguity as to whether the
disclosure, if taken alone, would have constituted an adverse action.
Nonetheless, the court's characterization of this error as "most
important" suggests that in another case, such an outcome may be
possible.
135. Hertenstein v. Kimberly Home Health Care, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1255 (D.
Kan. 1999).
136. Part V addresses how these and related issues might be incorporated into this
Article's retaliatory disclosure framework.
137. 123 F. Supp. 2d 773 (D. Del. 2000).
138. Id. at 779.
139. Id. at 776.
140. Id. at 777.
141. Id. at 778-79.
142. Id. at 779.
143. Id. at 778-79.
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2. Post-White Cases Addressing Whether Disclosure Is Actionable
The pre-White retaliatory disclosure cases show that no coherent
approach to retaliatory disclosure claims was emerging in the earlier
case law. Thus, it is unnecessary to look to cases decided subsequent
to the newer standard White articulated to determine if it provides
employers with guidance as to when they may not disclose the
existence of a complaint of discrimination or the identity of the
complainant. The review of the newer case law provides no clearer an
answer.
At least initially, post-White cases have only addressed discrete
issues on a seemingly ad hoc basis and do not provide the necessary
direction. In Bowman-Farrell v. Cooperative Education Service
Agency 8,14 the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
rejected a plaintiff's Title VII claim that her public employer
retaliated against her by disclosing to a complained-of party certain
unnamed details of the plaintiffs discrimination allegations.'45
Although Bowman-Farrell was decided after White, the court's
disposition of other retaliation claims on the grounds that they did
not cause an adverse employment action indicates that the court was
operating under a pre-White standard.146 The court seemed to
mandate a more substantial link to employment, a link clearly absent
from the requirements in White."4 Without significant discussion of
the standard, however, the court granted summary judgment on the
plaintiff's retaliatory disclosure claim, explaining that "presumably at
some point in a retaliation complaint the accused is going to learn the
details of the complaint against her."148
But two cases following White more directly and substantially
address the question of when employer disclosure of a discrimination
complaint can rise to the level of retaliation under Title VII. The
recent opinion by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Allen v. McPhee1 4 9
may shed light on how an employer might respond to a charge of
discrimination in the public eye without incurring retaliation against
the charging party.'
144. No. 02-C-818, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77283, at *78 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 17, 2007).
145. Id. at *78-79.
146. Id. at *60.
147. Id.
148. Id. at *79.
149. 240 S.W.3d 803 (Tenn. 2007), abrogated by Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320
S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010).
150. Although Allen v. McPhee is a state case interpreting the Tennessee Human
Rights Act (THRA), the framework for establishing a prima facie retaliation claim under
the THRA mirrors that under Title VII, requiring (1) a known protected activity, (2) a
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The plaintiff in Allen, who worked in a university president's
office, filed complaints with the Tennessee Board of Regents alleging
that she was subjected to sexual harassment by the president
himself. t ' Following the allegations, the president issued two press
releases acknowledging that he was the subject of sexual harassment
complaints by an employee of the university and denying the
allegations. 152 He additionally granted an interview to the university's
student newspaper, during which he vehemently denied the
allegations against him and characterized the complaints as false
accusations."' The plaintiff alleged that the president's public
discussion of her allegations and his puffery-style denial and
denigration of the charges against him amounted to retaliation under
the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA"). 5 4 Noting that none of
the public statements identified her by name or otherwise provided
information leading to the discovery of her identity, the court rejected
her theory.'
The court's decision in Allen sheds light on how a federal court
might interpret a claim regarding disclosure of a confidential
complaint. The court's analysis recognizes as reasonable an accused's
desire to refute allegations of discrimination and, by negative
materially adverse action, and (3) a causal connection between the two. Id. at 807. And,
significantly, the THRA applies the White standard to the "materially adverse action"
prong of the retaliation test, allowing a retaliation claim anchored on an act unrelated to
employment if it has the requisite objectively identifiable deterrent effect on protected
activity. See id. at 820-21.
151. Id. at 809.
152. Id. at 810-11.
153. Id. at 811.
154. Id. at 824.
155. The court explained:
Although both press releases imply that [the president] was being falsely accused
of sexual harassment and were arguably intended to curry favor with the public,
this alone is insufficient to support a finding that the press releases were materially
adverse to [the plaintiff]. We are unwilling to hold that a person accused of sexual
harassment necessarily exposes himself to liability for retaliation merely by
asserting his innocence publicly. A reasonable employee would expect that a
person accused of harassment will oppose the accusation. This is no less true of
public figures who, as a result of their public status, will be expected to respond to
the accusations publicly. While public figures do not have license to use their
status to bully or embarrass their accuser, we hold that a reasonable employee
would not be dissuaded from reporting discrimination based solely on the fact that
the accused will publicly assert his innocence. Because the press releases are
essentially limited to statements that imply [the president]'s innocence, we




implication, hints that disclosure of the name of a charging party
might tread impermissibly into the domain of the materially adverse
action."1 6
Most recently, in Franklin v. Local 2 of the Sheet Metal Workers
International Ass'n,m"I the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted
the question of whether revelation of a charge and the identity of a
charging party amounts to retaliation under Title VII.' In Franklin,
several members of the Sheet Metal Workers' union filed charges
with their local EEOC office alleging that the union's referral
practices were racially discriminatory.5 9 Shortly thereafter, the union
began posting its legal bills relating to the charges for all to see. 1 The
bills detailed the charging parties' names and some of their
allegations.16' The charging parties filed another charge based on the
posting practice, alleging it amounted to unlawful retaliation.'62 The
EEOC agreed. 63 In response to criticism from the EEOC, the union
continued to post the bills but redacted the charging parties' names.1
The union, however, continued to read aloud information from the
bills, including the names, during union meetings.1 6 The district court
granted summary judgment for the union on the retaliation claims,
finding that although the posting of the names was actionable under
Title VII, the union had a non-retaliatory reason for its postings-
namely, the duty to inform its members about the basis for its legal
expenditures and to obtain members' approval for such
expenditures. '6
The Eighth Circuit reversed.'" The postings and name-reading at
meetings did amount to adverse actions within the meaning of Title
VII's retaliation provisions after White, the court explained."
However, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the public
revelation and posting of information regarding the existence of their
156 Id. (noting that the press releases did not identify the plaintiff complainant by
name or provide sufficient information to lead others to easily identify her).
157. 565 F.3d 508 (8th Cir. 2009).
158. Id. at 513.
159. Id. at 512.
160. Id. at 512-13.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 513.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 513-14.
167. See id. at 521.
168. Id.
2013] 917
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
charges and their identities was "per se" retaliatory.169 Given the
union's duty to obtain approval for legal fees, the court explained, the
posting alone could not fairly amount to per se retaliation.7 0
However, reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment
for the union, the Eighth Circuit found that some of the union's
actions-such as announcing the plaintiffs' names at the meetings-
might have published the plaintiffs' identities more widely than
necessary.171 Given that detail, the court explained, a genuine issue of
fact remained regarding the retaliation claim that precluded summary
judgment being entered on that claim.172
The cases decided prior to White no longer seem to be instructive
in light of the clarified adverse action standard provided in White.
Those decided after White-though perhaps instructive in building
the various constituent parts-provide little in the way of a well-
developed framework to guide employers or courts faced with claims
of retaliatory disclosure. Thus, we look elsewhere for additional
guidance to fashion such a framework.
III. ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF GUIDANCE
The fact is that some disclosure of charging party identity is likely
necessary in some cases. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that
widespread disclosure of the charging party's identity--or even the
threat of such disclosure-can be coercive and may, in some
circumstances, lead a would-be charging party to abandon his or her
claim. The retaliation case law provides insufficient guidance in
drawing the line between permissible and retaliatory disclosure. In
addition, the nondisclosure and confidentiality requirements
otherwise active when a charge of discrimination is filed with the
EEOC are inapplicable. As a result, a court applying the White
"dissuade a reasonable worker" standard will need to look elsewhere
for guidance in retaliatory disclosure cases. We discuss two sources of
such guidance in this Section: federal courts' standards to determine
when a litigant can proceed under a pseudonym and social science
research regarding whistle-blowing employees.
169. See id. at 520.
170. Id. at 521.
171. See id. ("Local 2 continued to read Appellant's names at union meetings.
Although Local 2's prior practice and obligation to disclose expenses may justify what
Local 2 did, the degree of Local 2's disclosures raises credibility issues and a potential




A. Anonymity/Pseudonymity in Litigation
As we have noted, the Title VII charge process is neither wholly
public nor wholly private. In federal courts, litigation is generally
public. Litigants are rarely allowed to proceed anonymously. Given
that context, understanding the circumstances and countervailing
interests at play when the public nature of litigation gives way is
helpful to delineating the parameters of retaliatory disclosure.
Anonymity runs afoul of both the public's common law right to access
judicial proceedings"' and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a),
which states that the title of every complaint shall "include the names
of all the parties." 17 4 However, many federal courts permit parties to
proceed anonymously when weighty circumstances justify secrecy.'
173. See Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir.
2000); see also Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 596 (1978) (noting the
"common-law privilege to inspect ... judicial records").
174. See FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a) ("Every pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the
name of the court, the title of the action, the file number, and a designation as in Rule
7(a). In the complaint the title of the action shall include the names of all the parties, but
in other pleadings it is sufficient to state the name of the first party on each side with an
appropriate indication of other parties.").
175. See, e.g., Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1062-63 (allowing Chinese plaintiffs
to proceed pseudonymously because they otherwise risked losing their jobs, being
burdened with debt, and being deported to China, where they would risk imprisonment);
Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 112 F.3d 869,872 (7th Cir. 1997) ("There
are exceptions. Records or parts of records are sometimes sealed for good reasons,
including the protection of state secrets, trade secrets, and informers; and fictitious names
are allowed when necessary to protect the privacy of children, rape victims, and other
particularly vulnerable parties or witnesses. But the fact that a case involves a medical
issue is not a sufficient reason for allowing the use of a fictitious name, even though many
people are understandably secretive about their medical problems."); James v. Jacobson, 6
F.3d 233, 238-39 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that anonymity is not warranted based on the
desire to avoid "annoyance" or "criticism," but may be warranted based on preservation
of privacy of information of a "highly personal nature," the threat of "physical or mental
harm" to the plaintiff or an innocent third party, or the age of the plaintiff); Doe v. INS,
867 F.2d 285, 286 n.1 (6th Cir. 1989); Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981)
(allowing plaintiffs who were challenging school prayer to proceed under pseudonym
because they risked harassment and they were forced to disclose personal, private
information in the challenge); Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(identifying "marriage and illegitimacy" as highly sensitive and personal information that
may warrant allowing a plaintiff to proceed anonymously), affd, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.
1982); see also Doe v. Bell At. Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 418, 420 (D. Mass. 1995)
("Courts have allowed plaintiffs to proceed anonymously in cases involving social
stigmatization, real danger of physical harm, or where the injury litigated against would
occur as a result of the disclosure of plaintiffs identity. Economic harm or mere
embarrassment are [sic] not sufficient to override the strong public interest in disclosure.
Cases in which parties are allowed to proceed anonymously because of privacy interests
often involve abortion, mental illness, personal safety, homosexuality, transsexuality and
illegitimate or abandoned children in welfare cases." (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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A review of federal court decisions reveals that there are three main
situations in which a plaintiff may proceed anonymously: (1) when
identification creates a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm;"'
(2) when anonymity is necessary "to preserve privacy in a matter of
sensitive and highly personal nature"; 7 7 and (3) when the anonymous
party is "compelled to admit [his or her] intention to engage in illegal
conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution." 7 8
Two of these three situations-where identification creates a risk
of retaliatory physical or mental harm and where the matter is
sensitive or highly personal in nature-implicate interests analogous
to those of plaintiffs in retaliatory disclosure claims. The following
Sections outline in more detail federal court rulings in these two
situations and shed light on how courts can fashion protection for
Title VII complainants against retaliatory disclosure.
1. Privacy
Courts often consider an individual's right to privacy as a critical
factor in determining whether she can proceed anonymously.
Sometimes, however, it is difficult to parse whether the nature of the
private matter or the possibility of embarrassment and potential for
ostracism are the motivating factors in the court's determination. For
example, particular cases involving challenges to religious practices
often receive special protection,1 79 while situations involving sexual
harassment claims and sexual assaults do not. 80
a. Matters Involving Religion
Courts appear more willing to protect an individual's identity
when the individual is challenging particular religious practices. This
heightened protection is more common in communities with strong
religious convictions where challenges to the religion subject the
176. See Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186; Gomez v. Buckeye Sugars, 60 F.R.D. 106, 107 (N.D.
Ohio 1973) (discussing mental harm).
177. James, 6 F.3d at 238; see also Doe v. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Mont.
1974) (discussing the same); Doe v. United Servs. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.R.D. 437, 439
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (discussing the "special circumstance[]" of protecting "privacy in a very
private manner" (citations omitted)).
178. Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185.
179. See, e.g., Doe v. Harlan Cnty. Sch. Dist., 96 F. Supp. 2d 667, 670-71 (E.D. Ky.
2000) (involving parents of a minor child who were permitted to proceed pseudonymously
in challenging the school district's practice of hanging the Ten Commandments in schools
because the plaintiffs could be subject to humiliation and harassment).
180. See, e.g., Bell At. Bus. Sys. Serys., Inc., 162 F.R.D. at 420 (denying a female




plaintiff to widespread and hostile ridicule by a unified group.' A
similar situation of widespread ostracism is likely not the case in
sexual harassment situations because there is likely no identified
group hostile to the putative victim.
In Doe v. Stegall," the court determined that the plaintiffs
challenging prayer in school could proceed anonymously. The court
explained:
Here, the Does complain of public manifestations of religious
belief; religion is perhaps the quintessentially private matter.
Although they do not confess either illegal acts or purposes, the
Does have, by filing suit, made revelations about their personal
beliefs and practices that are shown to have invited an
opprobrium analogous to the infamy associated with criminal
behavior. Evidence on the record indicates that the Does may
expect extensive harassment and perhaps even violent reprisals
if their identities are disclosed to a Rankin County community
hostile to the viewpoint reflected in plaintiffs' complaint."'
Similarly, in Doe v. Harlan County School District,?" parents of a
child attending middle school in Kentucky were permitted to proceed
pseudonymously when they challenged the school district's practice of
hanging the Ten Commandments in classrooms. 85 The court stated:
In a similar case, the Fifth Circuit held that the showing of
possible harm, the risk of serious social ostracization based
upon religious attitudes, and the fundamentally private nature
of religious beliefs required that a child litigant remain
anonymous. Because this case also involves a religious matter, a
child litigant, and a community which is highly interested in this
issue's resolution, a balancing of interests justifies the plaintiffs'
continued anonymity.'I
These cases suggest that the sensitive nature of religious
objection, especially when unpopular, may be sufficiently weighty to
overcome the presumption in favor of naming parties in a case. But it
cannot be ignored that the cases pertain centrally to religious
challenges of children, and so it must be considered that the courts'
recognition of the need for privacy is heavily influenced by the tender
181. See Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 96 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
185. Id. at 670-71.
186. Id. at 671 (internal citation omitted).
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age of the plaintiffs.
b. Matters Involving Sexuality and Abortion
In matters involving sexuality, courts seem willing to protect
individuals' privacy. For example, several courts have allowed
transsexuals to sue under pseudonyms.1" In addition, a court has
acknowledged that an individual has a right to have his identity
protected if the case will reveal that he is a homosexual. 88 The court
asserted that while lawsuits are typically public events in which the
public has an interest, keeping the plaintiff's sexual identity private
was necessary to protect his privacy in light of the widespread public
fear engendered by AIDS. 189
It is no surprise that courts are also sensitive to anonymity
concerns in matters involving abortion. Courts are willing to allow
pregnant women bringing actions to contest the validity of laws and
regulations involving abortions to proceed anonymously.190
Furthermore, the Supreme Court implicitly endorsed anonymity in
several important abortion cases including Roe v. Wadet9' and Doe v.
Bolton.' In addition, the Court has allowed anonymity in a birth
control case, Poe v. Ullman."9s That said, however, in M.M. v.
Zavaras," a district court would not allow an inmate to proceed
187. See McClure v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409, 412 & n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (allowing
plaintiff who was seeking insurance coverage for gender reassignment surgery to proceed
as "Ann Doe"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188
(1982); Doe v. Alexander, 510 F. Supp. 900, 902 (D. Minn. 1981) (involving applicant for
commission as an army reserve officer who was rejected due to her prior gender
reassignment surgery); Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76, 77 (S.D. Tex. 1980). In McConn
the court explained that "[tihe Jane Doe Plaintiffs and Plaintiff M.B., in various stages of
sexual transition, are suing under fictitious names to insulate themselves from possible
harassment, to protect their privacy, and to protect themselves from prosecution resulting
from this action." Id. at 77.
188. Doe v. United Servs. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.R.D. 437, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
189. Id. ("Concern to avoid public identification as a homosexual is heightened in light
of the widespread public fear engendered by the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
('AIDS') crisis."). Of course we may now find that the court's specific reasoning
incorporated antiquated notions about homosexuality and AIDS; nevertheless, the court
was animated by its evaluation of the possibility that the facts of the case presented some
risk of social stigma. See id. That concern, even if not its particular application in this case,
appears to be timeless.
190. See generally Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Propriety and Effect of Use of
Fictitious Name of Plaintiff in Federal Court, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 369 (1998) (analyzing cases
where a plaintiff proceeds under a pseudonym in federal court).
191. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
192. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
193. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
194. 939 F. Supp. 799 (D. Colo. 1996).
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under a pseudonym when she sought to compel the state department
of corrections to pay for her abortion because the court reasoned that
the public's interest in the use of public funds outweighed the
inmate's interest in anonymity. 9 s
c. Matters Involving Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault
Sexual assault and sexual harassment claims have typically
received the least amount of anonymity protection, though case
outcomes in this area are mixed.' 6 In Doe v. Bell Atlantic Business
Systems Services, Inc.,'" a Massachusetts district court would not
allow a plaintiff who alleged that she had been sexually harassed and
assaulted by her work supervisor to file pseudonymously. 98 The court
held that "[elconomic harm or mere embarrassment are [sic] not
sufficient" to warrant anonymity. 199 It further held that the plaintiff
had not demonstrated a compelling need for privacy that outweighed
the rights of the defendant and the public to open proceedings. 2 0
More recently, in Doe v. Penzato,20 1 the Northern District of
California granted a plaintiff's request to proceed under a pseudonym
in her case alleging that the defendants, a couple in whose U.S. home
she lived and worked, subjected her to human trafficking, forced
labor, and sexual assault.21 The court agreed with defendants that the
plaintiff had evidenced little reasonable fear of retaliatory reprisal.2 "
But, in finding that anonymity was appropriate, the court accepted
the plaintiff's claims that revelation of her identity in open pleadings
would subject her to psychological trauma and an invasion of her
privacy. 204 Finally, the court was persuaded that the public interest in
encouraging victims of human trafficking to come forward-an
interest that would be harmed, the plaintiff alleged, if victims were
forced to reveal their identities-weighed in favor of plaintiff
anonymity. 205
195. Id. at 802.
196. See, e.g., Doe v. Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 418, 420-21 (D. Mass.
1995); Doe v. Hallock, 119 F.R.D. 640, 640-41 (S.D. Miss. 1987); see also S. Methodist
Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 707 (5th Cir. 1979)
(involving a claim for sexual discrimination).
197. 162 F.R.D. 418 (D. Mass. 1995).
198. Id. at 422.
199. Id. at 420.
200. Id. at 422.
201. No. CV1O-5154 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51681 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2011).
202. Id. at *2-3.
203. See id. at *9.
204. Id.
205, Id. at *12-13.
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In comparing cases involving abortion and cases involving sexual
harassment or assault, it appears that some courts are likely to find
that pregnant women challenging abortion laws deserve more privacy
protection than victims of sexual harassment or assault because of
both the extremely private nature of abortion and the potential for
public ridicule. This view might exist because sexual harassment and
assault cases always involve another or several other people, so the
victim has already lost some privacy as a matter of course.
Furthermore, the public might be more critical of a woman
challenging an abortion law than a victim of sexual harassment or
assault. Yet there is some support, anchored by the public interest in
encouraging reports of sexual assault, perhaps, for providing alleged
victims anonymity in pursuing alleged perpetrators.
2. Fear of Reprisal 20 6
Fear of reprisal or retribution can be a critical factor in
determining whether anonymity is required. "That a plaintiff may
suffer embarrassment or economic harm is not enough" to warrant
use of a pseudonym. 207 Rather, a plaintiff must convince the court that
he is in danger of real harm.208 In cases involving the threat of
physical retribution, courts usually rule in favor of those seeking
206. Throughout the remainder of this Article, we use the words "reprisal" or
"retribution" to refer to acts carried out against an individual that are detrimental to that
individual. These types of actions might constitute the materially adverse action in a
retaliation claim as described supra in Part I.B, but are broader than that as well. We
choose not to use the term "retaliation" in its colloquial sense to avoid confusion; we use
"retaliation" only in reference to the legal claim. Our use of "reprisal" and "retribution"
reflects the broad definition of retaliation in the whistleblowing literature. See, e.g.,
Michael T. Rehg et al., Antecedents and Outcomes of Retaliation Against Whistleblowers:
Gender Differences and Power Relationships, 19 ORG. SCI. 221,222 (2008) (" '[R]etaliation
against whistleblowers represents an outcome of a conflict between an organization and its
employee, in which members of the organization attempt to control the employee by
threatening to take, or actually taking, an action that is detrimental to the well-being of
the employee, in response to the employee's reporting, through internal or external
channels, a perceived wrongful action.'" (quoting Michael T. Rehg, An Examination of
the Retaliation Process Against Whistle-Blowers: A Study of Federal Government
Employees 17 (June 29, 1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review))). The literature treats reprisal and retaliation
as including both the imposition of negative consequences and the withholding of positive
benefits to the whistleblower. See, e.g., John P. Keenan, Comparing Indian and American
Managers on Whistleblowing, 14 EMP. RESPS. & RTs. J. 79, 82 (2002) ("Reprisal involves
taking an undesirable action against an employee or not taking a desirable action because
that employee disclosed information about a serious problem."). We do as well.
207. Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 2011).
208. Id
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anonymity.2' For example, in EEOC v. ABM Industries Inc., 21
0 the
court allowed eight employees to intervene anonymously in a Title
VII action brought by the EEOC against an employer because the
employees had an objectively reasonable fear that their supervisor
would physically threaten or harm them.' The employees' need for
anonymity outweighed any prejudice to defendants and the public's
interest in knowing their identities.2 12
On borderline retribution cases, however, courts have diverged
greatly. For example, in the seminal case of Southern Methodist
University Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe,213 the
court found that the possibility of humiliation and reprisal was not
sufficient to warrant anonymity in a sexual discrimination case,
because the plaintiffs-female law students and lawyers-faced no
greater threat of reprisal than a typical plaintiff alleging civil rights
violations. 214 The court was unsympathetic to the plaintiffs' argument
that disclosure of their identities would leave them vulnerable to
retribution from their current employers, prospective future
employers, and the organized bar.215 In addition, in Doe v. Hallock,
a sexual harassment and sexual assault case, the court found that the
plaintiff had "not demonstrated that this is an exceptional case in
which a compelling need exists to protect an important safety or
privacy interest."2 17 The court reasoned that such reprisal was more
likely to come from defendants, who already knew the victim's
identity, rather than from the community at large. 2 8 Therefore, fear
of reprisal did not support the need for anonymity. Yet, in Doe v.
Stegall,219 the court found that a mother and her two children could
proceed anonymously because their suit, which challenged the
constitutionality of prayer and Bible-reading exercises in Mississippi
209. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 922 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981) (using
pseudonyms in opinion because appellant, a prison inmate, "faced a risk of serious bodily
harm" if his role as a government witness were disclosed).
210. 249 F.R.D. 588 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
211. Id. at 594.
212. Id. at 595.
213. 599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979).
214. Id. at 713.
215. Id.
216. 119 F.R.D. 640 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
217. Id. at 644 (noting also that, because the defendants were publicly named in the
complaint, they had been exposed to reputational harm and embarrassment and that
fairness dictated revelation of the plaintiff's identity as well).
218. See id. ("Rather, the source of any harassment apparently is already aware of
plaintiff's identity, and there is little reason to believe that disclosure of her identity in this
lawsuit would serve to increase the number of such incidents.").
219. 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981).
9252013]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
public schools, would likely lead to harassment and possible violence
by members of their community.2 20
The Ninth Circuit has outlined the clearest standard for dealing
with cases involving the threat of reprisal, evolving in two major steps
over the course of a decade. It first considered the following factors in
determining whether anonymity is necessary: "(1) the severity of the
threatened harm; (2) the reasonableness of the anonymous party's
fears; and (3) the anonymous party's vulnerability to such
retaliation."2 2' In Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp.,222 the
court found that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
Chinese employees the ability to proceed anonymously. 223 The
employees, on appeal, argued that if their identities were revealed,
they could lose their jobs, be deported, be burdened with debts, and
be imprisoned in China if unable to pay.224 The court found that the
threatened harms to the Chinese workers were reasonable given
evidence of collaboration between labor contracting agencies and the
Chinese government.22 5 In addition, the court found that the
employers would suffer no prejudice from the plaintiffs' anonymity
and that permitting use of pseudonyms would serve the public
interest by allowing the suit to go forward, perhaps helping future
plaintiffs.2 26
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Advanced Textile Corp. from
Southern Methodist University Ass'n of Women Law Students by
pointing out that "[w]hile threats of termination and blacklisting are
perhaps typical methods by which employers retaliate against
employees who assert their legal rights, the consequences of this
ordinary retaliation to plaintiffs are extraordinary." 227 In addition, the
court made it clear that where there are threats of extraordinary
retribution such as deportation, arrest, and imprisonment, plaintiffs
do not need to prove threat of physical harm.22 8
In addition to the three-factored test articulated by the Ninth
220. Id. at 186. Stegall also involved privacy issues concerning the Does' religious
beliefs, see supra text accompanying note 183, and documentation of the physical threats
to the plaintiffs in a local newspaper. Stegall, 653 F.2d at 182 n.6, 187.
221. Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1069.
224. Id. at 1071.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1072-73.
227. Id. at 1071 (noting that termination could ultimately result in these employees




Circuit in Advanced Textile Corp., it held ten years later in Doe v.
Kamehameha Schools2 9 that consideration of a party's request to
proceed anonymously must also include the threat of prejudice to the
opposing party and the public interest in freely available
information .2 3  The addition of these factors reveals attention to
interests beyond solely those of the plaintiff seeking anonymity. 231
B. Social Science Research
While the approach to anonymity in litigation provides the
beginnings of a framework for evaluating claims of retaliatory
disclosure, the reasonable employee standard announced in White
requires us to seek additional guidance for implementing it. The goal
is to fashion a standard that allows courts to separate disclosure that,
although uncomfortable, is not an adverse action from disclosure that
"could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting
a charge of discrimination." 232 What courts determine a reasonable
worker should withstand and what actually would dissuade a
reasonable worker ought to have some basis in reality. Fortunately, a
substantial body of social science research has begun to provide
insight into how employees react to conflict and discrimination in the
workplace. In this Section, we summarize some findings of this
literature, which helps to develop the retaliatory disclosure
framework we propose in the next Part.
Three important themes emerge from the social science
literature: that the fear of reprisal, whether or not reprisal is actually
likely, acts as a disincentive to whistleblowing; that whistleblowers are
negatively viewed as a threat to existing social order; and that victims
are often reluctant to think of themselves as such.233 They inform our
inquiry and guide the development of the framework we describe in
the next Part. We elaborate on each in turn.
229. 596 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2010).
230. Id. at 1042.
231. See infra Part V for how we propose these interests can be incorporated into our
retaliatory disclosure framework.
232. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,57 (2006).
233. Professor Deborah L. Brake, in her seminal article on the promise and failures of
the retaliation claim, first explicated the three themes. See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation,
90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 25-42 (2005). For our discussion, we have reordered and expanded
upon them with additional and updated research, as well as adapted them for the specific
context of retaliatory disclosure. Nonetheless, Professor Brake's excellent discussion
served as a guide for our exploration of the social science literature.
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1. Whistleblowers'23 4 Perceptions and the Reality of Reprisal
First, the threat of reprisal for reporting wrongful acts creates a
disincentive for victims to report them.2 35 This is true regardless of
whether reprisals are carried out in fact. Studies support the common
sense notion that would-be whistleblowers engage in a cost-benefit
analysis when deciding whether to report wrongdoing.236 Those who
report conclude that the potential benefits of doing so outweigh the
potential costsY 7 Those who remain silent come to the opposite
conclusion. 238 Thus, when an employee is confronted with the decision
234. For purposes of clarity and ease of reading, in this section we will refer to those
who report the bad behavior of others, including employees who file charges of
discrimination with the EEOC, as "whistleblowers." The definition of "whistleblower" in
the social science literature is broader than the meaning sometimes used in the law. Most
of the social science literature considers individuals who report wrongdoing for the
purpose of creating organizational change to be whistleblowers, even if that reporting is
nonpublic and even if the organizational change sought is solely for the whistleblower's
personal gain (rather than for the benefit of the general public). See, e.g., Rehg et al.,
supra note 206, at 222 ("Following earlier research, we define whistle-blowing as 'the
disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate
practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be
able to effect action.'" (quoting Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Organizational
Dissidence: The Case of Whistle-Blowing, 4 J. Bus. ETHICS 1, 4 (1985))). See generally
MARCIA P. MICELI, JANET P. NEAR & TERRY MOREHEAD DWORKIN, WHISTLE-
BLOWING IN ORGANIZATIONS (2008) (providing a comprehensive overview of whistle-
blowing literature). Laws addressing whistleblowing sometimes give the impression that
whistleblowers are more narrowly constituted of those who publicly disclose wrongdoing
for the benefit of the general population. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5
U.S.C. § 2302 (2006 & Supp. 2010); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006 &
Supp. 2010).
235. But see Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV.
1757, 1772 (2007) (arguing that "fear of retaliation is not dominant in preventing observers
of wrongdoing from coming forward"). We do not argue that the threat of reprisal always
stops a whistleblower, but rather that it can. Subsequent research supports the notion that,
although threats of reprisal against a particular individual whistleblower tend not to deter
that whistleblower from continuing with her complaint, they might deter subsequent
potential whistleblowers. See Rehg et al., supra note 206, at 235-36.
236. See, e.g., Mark Keil et al., Toward a Theory of Whistleblowing Intentions: A
Benefit-to-Cost Differential Perspective, 41 DECISION SCI. 787, 789, 804 (2010) (presenting
a study of 159 information technology project managers who had been presented with
multiple scenarios testing their whistleblowing intention and finding that would-be
whistleblowers' calculation of the "benefit-to-cost differential" plays the "crucial
mediating role" linking drivers of whistleblowing to whistleblowing intentions); cf
MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE ORGANIZATIONAL
AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES 4-15 (1992) (engaging in
a cost-benefit analysis of the entire whistleblowing enterprise).
237. See Keil et al., supra note 236, at 805 ("[T]he key to creating an honest and open
reporting environment is to keep the benefit-to-cost differential as high as possible for the
individual by maximizing the benefits of reporting and/or minimizing the costs.").
238. See Paul Harvey, Mark J. Martinko & Scott C. Douglas, Causal Perception and the
Decision to Speak Up or Pipe Down, in VOICE AND SILENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS 63, 74
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to report discrimination or file a charge, the analysis depends on
expected chances of reprisal. Perceptions of the likelihood of
retribution are just as important as the reality, if not more so. Those
perceptions can include fears of not being believed; of reprisals like
"reprimands, punitive transfers, threats, demotion, and dismissal";2
40
of embarrassment or humiliation; of slander and harassment; of social
isolation; and of being labeled a troublemaker.24 ' These perceptions,
though, are not wholly subjective or abstract. They are informed by a
number of contextual factors that affect calculations that those fears
will be realized.
The contextual factors are largely based on the characteristics of
the institution, the wrongdoer, and the whistleblower herself.
Institutional organization and structure have a strong influence on
would-be whistleblowers' perceptions of the likelihood of reprisal and
the actual likelihood of reprisal. For instance, if an individual
perceives that previous whistleblowers in her organization have
experienced reprisal, then she will be less likely to blow the whistle.
24 2
Conversely, employees will be more likely to report wrongdoing in
(Jerald Greenberg & Marissa S. Edwards eds., 2009) ("The likelihood of speaking up also
is likely to be affected by the extent to which observers expect to receive tangible
punishments or rewards for reporting deviant behavior." (citation omitted)).
239. See id. (naming the "extent to which observers expect to receive "rewards or
punishments" and a general "fear of negative outcomes" as factors which may deter
whistleblowers); Keil et al., supra note 236, at 790 (reviewing research suggesting that
whistleblowers are inhibited from reporting by their "perceived risk of negative personal
consequences" or "when [they] expect[] negative consequences").
240. Keil et al., supra note 236, at 788.
241. See Elizabeth H. Dodd et al., Respected or Rejected: Perceptions of Women Who
Confront Sexist Remarks, 45 SEx ROLES 567, 569 (2001); Keil et al., supra note 236, at 788.
242. As noted supra note 235, there is evidence that the fear of reprisal against a
whistleblower is not a significant source of deterrence for that whistleblower. See, e.g.,
Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Whistle-Blowing: Myth and Reality, 22 J. MGMT. 507,
523 (1996) (reporting that results of large-scale surveys "indicate that most whistle-
blowers do not suffer retaliation and may not consider it an overwhelming determinant of
their actions in deciding whether to report wrongdoing"). However, some studies indicate
that the opposite is true, id. ("Results from case studies, however, lead to opposite
conclusions .... "), and many continue to cite fear of reprisal as a deterrent to those who
consider reporting an incident. See, e.g., Marissa S. Edwards, Neal M. Ashkanasy & John
Gardner, Deciding to Speak Up or to Remain Silent Following Observed Wrongdoing: The
Role of Discrete Emotions and Climate of Silence, in VOICE AND SILENCE IN
ORGANIZATIONS 83, 94 (Jerald Greenberg & Marissa S. Edwards eds., 2009)
("[Ejmpirical studies indicate that fear plays an important role in many employees'
decisions to withhold information or concerns from their employers."). Scholars also do
not rule out the possibility that reprisal against one employee will deter reporting by other
employees in the future; many studies do not reach this issue. See, e.g., Rehg et al., supra
note 206, at 235 ("We should note that retaliation may have had a chilling effect on other
would-be whistleblowers, but we could not test this assumption with our data.").
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
organizations that have policies and procedures that create the
impression that a whistleblower will be taken seriously and assisted.243
Otherwise, if an employee perceives that her organization tolerates-
or, worse, relies on-wrongdoing, she likely will not complain.2"
Moreover, institutions that are perceived to be hierarchical and
authoritarian in structure create power dynamics that can more
readily inhibit employees from blowing the whistle. 245 As discussed in
the next two paragraphs, power dynamics between the victim and the
perpetrator affect whether wrongdoing is reported. The structure of
an organization can create or exacerbate such power differentials.
In addition to institutional characteristics, the individual
characteristics of the would-be whistleblower can affect both her
perception of the chances for negative response to reporting and the
reality that reprisal will occur if wrongdoing is reported. Those who
have lower power within an organization are particularly vulnerable
in this regard. 21 That lack of power can result from several
characteristics, including being a member of traditionally
marginalized groups.24 7 Moreover, isolation can lead to low power,
especially isolation from institutional powerbrokers.24
Individuals who fit more than one of these characteristics are
243. See Harvey, Martinko & Douglas, supra note 238, at 73-74.
244. Cf MICELI, NEAR & DWORKIN, supra note 234, at 148-50 (explaining that the
more dependent an organization has become on a particular wrongdoing, the less likely
whistleblowing is to be effective).
245. See id. at 157 ("Organizations that are more hierarchial [sic], bureaucratic, or
authoritarian may be less open to whistle-blowing challenges."); Deborah Erdos Knapp et
al., Determinants of Target Responses to Sexual Harassment: A Conceptual Framework, 22
ACAD. MGMT. REv. 687, 712 (1997) ("[Olur framework and the supporting literature also
indicate that the organization not only affects climate and policy issues but also has an
impact on the formation of individual expectancies concerning the outcomes of responses
to [sexual harassment].").
246. See Rehg et al., supra note 206, at 224 ("Power and status generally are inversely
related to retaliation, so that employees with lower power are more likely to suffer reprisal
than those with greater power." (citation omitted)).
247. See id. (explaining how status characteristic theory posits that status leads to
influence and power and that "status within the workplace is somewhat influenced by
status outside the workplace," particularly noting that gender affects status outside the
workplace).
248. See MICELI, NEAR & DWORKIN, supra note 234, at 103 ("All other factors being
equal[,] ... whistle-blowers with little power can be ignored or retaliated against more
easily and with fewer negative consequences to the organization, than can those who hold
high-level positions or have special expertise that is needed and hard to replace, who are
well respected for their experience and competence."); cf Janet P. Near & Tamila C.
Jensen, The Whistleblowing Process: Retaliation and Perceived Effectiveness, 10 WORK &
OCCUPATIONS 3, 23 (1983) (finding that the "comprehensiveness of retaliation" as
perceived by whistleblowers was greatest when the whistleblower likewise perceived a
lack of support from top management).
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particularly likely to be subjected to reprisal and, thus, particularly
likely to be silenced by the fear of reprisal. 249 Take for instance, an
African-American woman who is employed as the first and only
female machine mechanic in a team of ten mechanics at a remote
mining operation. She belongs to two demographic groups that have
traditionally enjoyed lower institutional power status: African-
Americans and women. She is also a pioneer; there are no other
women mechanics.250 She is isolated demographically; however, she is
also isolated geographically and relationally from the organization's
powerbrokers, who presumably reside in a less remote area and work
at the corporate headquarters. She is extraordinarily vulnerable to
reprisal and, thus, much more likely to remain silent. Supervisors, by
contrast, tend to have more power to assist with their attempts to
blow the whistle and thus are less likely to face retaliation in response
to whistleblowing. 251' Nevertheless, studies suggest that the elevation
of supervisory status can be negatively overcome by other
characteristics that create a power deficit (for example, being a
woman or minority) .2 2 Thus, even if the African-American woman in
our hypothetical is promoted from line mechanic to a managerial
position, her minority and female statuses may be more salient in
dissuading her from reporting any discrimination than her newfound
organizational power might be in providing her encouragement to
blow the whistle.
The relative power between the victim and the perpetrator is also
a contextual characteristic that affects both the perception and the
reality of reprisal." The more powerful the perpetrator is within the
249. For instance, women who are "gender pioneers" in their particular positions or
organizations are more likely to suffer marginalization, reprisal, and silencing. See MICELI,
NEAR & DWORKIN, supra note 234, at 108; Lilia M. Cortina et al., What's Gender Got To
Do with It? Incivility in the Federal Courts, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 235, 244 (2002)
(reporting on a study that showed female attorneys experienced more interpersonal
mistreatment than their male counterparts); Knapp et al., supra note 245, at 704
(discussing the plight of gender pioneers in terms of organizational support).
250. Trailblazing women who enter professions traditionally occupied by men face a
unique isolation: having violated the traditional social structure, they are placed under
greater scrutiny to see if they "measure up" and are allowed little leeway when they
deviate from authority or role expectations. Rehg et al., supra note 206, at 224.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 235 ("[Flemale whistleblowers received the same treatment regardless of
the amount of organizational power they held: Their status as women overrode their status
as powerful or powerless organization members.").
253. Cf Karl Aquino, How Employees Respond to Personal Offense: The Effects of
Blame, Attribution, Victim Status and Gender Status on Revenge and Reconciliation in the
Workplace, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 52, 57 (2001) (finding that "employees were more
willing to exact revenge against less powerful offenders"); Sung Hee Kim, Richard H.
9312013]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
organization, the less likely the organization is to address the subject
of the complaint or any reprisal that follows reporting the
perpetrator's wrongdoing, especially if the victim enjoys little
institutional power.25 By contrast, where the perpetrator has
relatively low power, the situation is more likely to be resolved
without threat of or actual retaliation.25S Recent research reveals that
power is often situational and particularistic, such that the power of
the perpetrator or the victim may vary with the leverage they bring to
the situation. 256 For instance, a victim with low indicators of general
power in an organization might enjoy greater power if the alleged
wrongdoing is associated with her particular area of expertise or when
the threat to her also threatens something of particular importance to
the organization 25 7 (for example, if she is an integral part of a team
that is assigned to an important project with an impending deadline).
2. Whistleblowers' Challenge to Existing Social Hierarchies
It may or may not be true as a general matter that people often
do not like complainers. More likely, people do not like complainers
whose complaints challenge the dominant social order. Or more
specifically, people who are the beneficiaries of the dominant social
order really do not like complainers whose complaints challenge that
order.25 8 Thus, when whistleblowers are in a position to present
Smith & Nancy L. Brigham, Effects of Power Imbalance and the Presence of Third Parties
on Reactions to Harm: Upward and Downward Revenge, 24 PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 353, 353 (1998) ("Power asymmetries between parties in conflict can
affect whether revenge will be carried out or suppressed." (citation omitted)). Revenge is
a broader term than retaliation in the social science literature. Retaliation may be
motivated by hoped-for revenge, but it does not have to be. Rehg et al., supra note 206, at
222.
254. See MICELI, NEAR & DWORKIN, supra note 234, at 103-04; Rehg et al., supra note
206, at 226.
255. See Kim, Smith & Brigham, supra note 253, at 354 (observing that people in low
power situations tend to be more compliant and willing to make concessions during
negotiations).
256. See Maria P. Miceli et al., Predicting Employee Reactions to Perceived
Organizational Wrongdoing: Demoralization, Justice, Proactive Personality, and Whistle-
Blowing, 65 HUM. REL. 923, 944 (2012) (detailing the first known study to support the
proposition that particularized leverage is predictive of whistleblowing).
257. See id. at 931, 944.
258. See Faye J. Crosby, Why Complain?, J. Soc. ISSUES, Spring 1993, at 169, 170-71
(describing social norms that value suffering in silence and view complainers negatively);
Robin E. Roy et al., If She's a Feminist It Must Not Be Discrimination: The Power of the
Feminist Label on Observers' Attributions About a Sexist Event, 60 SEx ROLES 422, 423
(2009) ("Several studies indicate that observers have negative reactions toward people




complaints that challenge the social order, they are stigmatized,
isolated, and otherwise subject to reprisals."' This dynamic is
especially harsh when it is combined with the tyranny of the majority.
When a whistleblower confronts privilege and that privilege is widely
shared by a dominant group, the group dynamics magnify the
possibility and perception of cost to the whistleblower. 26
Studies have shown that, for instance, men and white people
react negatively to both women and people of color when they
complain about unfair treatment. 2 61 Remarkably, that is true even
when the complainant has strong evidence to support her claim-and
even when evaluators are presented with that evidence and "believe"
it.262 Moreover, in a study in which negative race-related comments
were confronted alternatively by white and black subjects, white
observers rated the white confronter as more persuasive (and the
comment as more biased) and the black confronter as simply rude
(and the comment less biased), even though the confronters used the
exact same script and responded to the same comment.2 63 The
implication is that the very fact of being a target of biased treatment
will result in negative reactions to one who confronts the bias.2*
In a study by Elizabeth Dodd and others where subjects
observed women who confronted sexist remarks (some blatant, some
more nuanced), the results showed that men reacted most negatively
to the women who confronted the blatant sexist remarks.2 s They
were less harsh on the women who objected to the more ambiguous
259. This tendency, as it relates to women, is explained in part by social role theory,
which "predicts that the gender-based societal division of labor reduces the influence of
women in work groups, regardless of their status, and that women who violate gender
expectations will be sanctioned." MICELI, NEAR & DWORKIN, supra note 234, at 108.
260. See Rehg et al., supra note 206, at 228 (theorizing that women, especially when
they are outnumbered by men, are more concerned about being labeled as a
"troublemaker" as a result of whistleblowing and, thus, will try to avoid the imposition of
that label).
261. For studies exemplifying this tendency, see generally Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T.
Miller, Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of Making Attributions to Discrimination, 27
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 254 (2001); Heather M. Rasinski & Alexander M.
Czopp, The Effect of Target Status on Witnesses' Reactions to Confrontations of Bias, 32
BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 8 (2010). Accord MICELI, NEAR & DWORKIN, supra
note 234, at 106 (explicating a model of predictors and outcomes of retaliation in which
reprisal is expected to be more comprehensive when the whistleblower is a member of a
minority group).
262. See Kaiser & Miller, supra note 261, at 262.
263. See Rasinski & Czopp, supra note 261, at 8, 11.
264. Id. at 9 ("People label targets as complainers when they claim that they have been
the victim of discrimination.").
265. Dodd et al., supra note 241, at 572-73, 575.
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remarks. 266 The authors attributed this to a social penalty that
privileged groups impose on role transgressors from marginalized
groups. 267 The social penalty is intended to maintain the dominant
social order.268 The greater challenge to the social order came from
the confrontation of the more direct expression of it (i.e., the blatant
sexist comment).' Thus, it merited the greater opprobrium from the
dominant group. 270
Yet there is some hope for those who blow the whistle in that the
research suggests that they may be able to seek out powerbrokers
who share their demographic characteristics without suffering the
same strong negative reactions. Notably, women observers in the
Dodd study involving sexist remarks did not share this negative
reaction. 271 In fact, they reacted more positively to those who
confronted the blatant sexism than those who did not.272 In general,
the identity and demographic characteristics of the complaint
recipient are important variables in the calculus of the
whistleblower.2 73 Though transgressors have reason to fear reprisal
from the dominant group, they may expect some greater level of
support and encouragement from their compatriots. 274 This is further
borne out by studies that find whistleblowing more likely when
whistleblowers can make private reports, especially when they can do
so anonymously or to a complaint recipient who shares the salient
characteristic that underlies the whistleblowers' complaint. 275
266. Id. at 575.
267. Id. ("[M]en are particularly likely to punish people for transgressing their
expected gender roles, whereas women may in fact react positively to both men and
women who exhibit such out-of-role behavior.").
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. See id. (describing research findings).
271. Id. at 573.
272. See id. at 574.
273. See Stangor et al., Reporting Discrimination in Public and Private Contexts, 82 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 69, 73 (2002) ("Moreover, the present research
demonstrates that the costs of reporting discrimination are particularly salient when the
social context includes members of another social category."). Indeed, the support of
middle managers (or lack thereof) is a significant predictor of the likelihood of reprisal.
See Rehg et al., supra note 206, at 224, 226.
274. But see Rasinski & Czopp, supra note 261, at 9 ("Furthermore, even fellow target
group members may label confronters as complainers, perhaps in an attempt to maintain
their group's positive image." (citing Donna M. Garcia et al., Perceivers' Responses to In-
Group and Out-Group Members Who Blame a Negative Outcome on Discrimination, 31
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 769 (2005))).
275. See, e.g., Stangor et al., supra note 273, at 72-73. For a more comprehensive
discussion of this point, see Brake, supra note 233, at 35 & n.51.
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3. People's Reluctance To Be Whistleblowers
The foregoing analysis of the social science related to
whistleblowing and retaliation is built on a foundation that people
fundamentally (and often unconsciously) avoid viewing themselves as
victims. Thus, people of all types are reluctant to acknowledge and
report discrimination of any kind. Part of that reluctance comes from
the strong tendency we all have to internalize the reasons for our bad
outcomes.7 Study subjects who failed tests, for example, were more
likely to explain that failure by their own shortcomings than by any
external factor, even when faced with evidence of bias by the test
administrator, unless that evidence was unambiguous.2 77 This effect
was once again multiplied when the dominant social hierarchy placed
the victim in a position subordinate to that of the wrongdoer. When
the discriminatory conduct of the wrongdoer is focused on a
marginalized population in a given circumstance, say minority racial
or religious groups or women, the tendency for internalization has
consistently proven strong.278 Thus, the very act of protesting
wrongdoing already is foreign to many of us. Just making the decision
to blow the whistle, divorced from any perception or reality of
reprisal, requires a significant departure from our typical way of
viewing the world. Psychologically we are hampered by the "just
world" hypothesis, which leads us to view the world as a place where
we control our destinies and our merit or lack thereof determines our
success.279 So, we distort our impressions of situations to blame
276. See, e.g., Brenda Major & Cheryl Kaiser, Perceiving and Claiming Discrimination,
in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH 285, 286-88 (Laura Beth
Nielsen & Robert Nelson eds., 2005) (discussing minimization of personal discrimination
as one view of why "members of disadvantaged groups typically miss, underestimate, or
deny the extent to which they are personally targets of prejudice"); Karen M. Ruggiero &
Donald M. Taylor, Why Minority Group Members Perceive or Do Not Perceive the
Discrimination that Confronts Them: The Role of Self-Esteem and Perceived Control, 72 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 373, 373-74 (1997) (same, despite their recognition of
group-based discrimination).
277. See Ruggiero & Taylor, supra note 276, at 374.
278. See id.
279. See Melvin J. Lerner, The Justice Motive: Some Hypotheses as to Its Origins and
Forms, 45 J. PERSONALITY 1, 1-2 (1977). Lerner explains that people have an inherent,
psychological desire to believe that the world is just and that, as a result, people get their
just deserts and deserve whatever they get. Id. Thus, when confronted with an injustice
visited upon an undeserving victim, observers will resort to cognitive reevaluation of the
situation to realign it with their underlying belief in justice. The cognitive process through
which this occurs is called "assimilation of injustice." Claudia Dalbert, Belief in a Just
World, in HANDBOOK OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 288, 289
(Mark R. Leary & Rick H. Hoyle eds., 2009). This can manifest itself by the observer
demonizing the victim. See Carolyn L. Hafer & Larent Bhgue, Experimental Research on
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ourselves, rather than others2? And, then, even when we do
recognize the wrongfulness of an action such as discriminatory
treatment, we are less likely to report it than we might otherwise
expect we are. People who have been subject to discriminatory
behavior often employ coping strategies rather than confront the
behavior. 81
Because we are reluctant to perceive ourselves as victims, and
reluctant to report that victimization even if we do perceive it, the
threat of reprisal of any kind is particularly troubling. Placing extra
costs on identifying and reporting bad behavior is likely to magnify
the fundamental tendency we all have to explain away bad behavior
of others as more likely due to our own failures. Our inherent
psychological makeup in this regard leads us to inaccurately evaluate
the cost-benefit analysis discussed at the beginning of this Section.282
Thus, courts should be very careful not to use the White reasonable
employee standard to undervalue the influence and effect of the
perceived likelihood of reprisal. Those behaviors that "could well
dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination"28 3 are likely broader than courts have thus far been
willing to accept.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR IDENTIFYING RETALIATORY DISCLOSURE
Based on the Supreme Court's guidance in White and the lower
Just-World Theory: Problems, Developments, and Future Challenges, 131 PSYCHOL. BULL.
128, 128-29 (2005); Melvin J. Lerner & Carolyn H. Simmons, Observer's Reaction to the
"Innocent Victim": Compassion or Rejection?, 4 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 203,
209 (1966) (finding that study subjects devalued the victim when they believed that the
victim would continue to suffer and they could not alleviate that suffering through
compensation). A strong belief in a just world has also been shown to lead to lower
perceptions of personal discrimination. See Isaac M. Lipkus & Ilene C. Siegler, The Belief
in a Just World and Perceptions of Discrimination, 127 J. PSYCHOL.: INTERDISCIPLINARY
& APPLIED 465, 470 (1993) (finding a relationship between the belief in a just world and
lower perceptions of personal sex, age, and religious discrimination).
280. See Faye Crosby, The Denial of Personal Discrimiation, 27 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 371, 374-75, 377-78 (1984).
281. See, e.g., Tawanda M. Greer, Coping Strategies as Moderators of the Relationship
Between Race- and Gender-Based Discrimination and Psychological Symptoms for African
American Women, 37 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 42, 43-44 (2011) (describing the results of
previous research on the coping strategies of African-American women); Janet K. Swim &
Lauri L. Hyers, Excuse Me-What Did You Just Say?!: Women's Public and Private
Responses to Sexist Remarks, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 68, 85 (1999) (finding
that coping strategies result in confrontation of sexist remarks at a rate much lower than
subjects predict they will).
282. See supra Part III.B.1.
283. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,57 (2006).
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courts' interpretation of that decision, supplemented significantly by
the two sources of guidance in Part III, we have developed the
following framework that courts should utilize when determining if
the employer's disclosure of a complaining employee's identity can be
the basis of a valid retaliation claim. Though some disclosure of a
complainant's identity is inevitable and even desirable, as explained
above,2m some types of broad disclosure surely are prompted by a
retaliatory motive and have the likelihood of dissuading a reasonable
employee from making such a claim. Complaining employees should
have some expectation that they are not engaging in a wholly private
process; however, some publications of a complaining employee's
identity and the details of the charge should be discouraged, because
they will interfere with the remedial purpose of Title VII. In other
words, such disclosures are prototypical materially adverse actions for
which employers should face potential liability.
The framework we propose-like the doctrine it navigates-will
not lead to easy, bright-line rulings. Instead, it provides a conceptual
structure from which courts, litigants, and employers facing
discrimination complaints may draw the salient considerations and
balance them based on the totality of the circumstances in order to
aid in the determination of whether a disclosure is truly retaliatory
(i.e., whether it "could well dissuade a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination"285).
We are initially guided by the approach the federal courts take to
determining whether to allow a litigant to proceed anonymously. The
two relevant considerations the courts use are concerns of privacy and
fear of reprisal. We, likewise, identify two possible ways that
disclosure might be retaliatory. Specifically, we suggest that disclosure
of a complaining employee's identity might be retaliatory based on
(1) the primary effect of the disclosure itself or (2) the potential for
secondary retaliatory actions that the disclosure makes more likely.
Put another way, on one hand, a reasonable employee might be
dissuaded from making a charge of discrimination simply because
wide publication of the details of the charge would subject the
employee to severe embarrassment, humiliation, or other invasion of
privacy. We call this "primary retaliatory disclosure." On the other
284. See supra Part I1.A.2.
285. White, 548 U.S. at 57.
286. We note that primary retaliatory disclosure may have some overlap-but is not by
necessity synonymous-with the theory behind the so-called "per se" retaliatory conduct
that the plaintiffs argued for and the court rejected in Franklin v. Local 2 of the Sheet
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hand, even if the details of the charge are not so salacious or
potentially embarrassing to cause an employee to fear disclosure as a
matter of general privacy or reputation, the disclosure of the charge
details may sufficiently increase the likelihood of reprisal from those
who learn about it such that the threat of those secondary effects
would dissuade a reasonable employee from making a charge. We call
this "secondary retaliatory disclosure."
A. Primary Retaliatory Disclosure
Though we expect such circumstances to be less frequent,
primary retaliatory disclosure could be based on privacy concerns,
much like anonymity in federal courts. For example, an employee
who is a minor and who was subjected to severe sexual harassment
might be dissuaded from making a charge if she thought the details of
the harassment would be widely publicized to her coworkers, her
community, or her parents. Similarly, though outside the Title VII
context, an employee with a disability might have a primary interest
in avoiding wide dissemination of the details of his or her disability
discrimination charge, which might compromise confidential medical
information. While we do not presume to provide the exact contours
of all the various situations under which a concern of primary
retaliatory disclosure might arise, courts would be well-served to
consult analogous cases addressing requests for anonymity in
litigation. If, for example, a court would be likely to grant the
charging party a request for anonymity if the charge proceeds to
court, then the charging party ought to enjoy the same right to
protection from publication and disclosure of her identity during the
charge and investigation phase of the case. Moreover, in the litigation
context the clear default legal standard is one of transparency, which
has a strong normative underpinning as part of our long-standing civil
processes. 28 7 That contrasts with the legally ambiguous, quasi-public
nature of the charge process, which is animated more by practical
than normative concerns. Thus, a charging party ought to sometimes
enjoy protection from retaliatory disclosure even when she would not
be allowed to proceed anonymously should the charge result in a
federal court case.
Applying this part of the framework to the Belmont Abbey case
that introduced this paper, the charging parties would be unlikely to
Metal Workers International Ass'n, 565 F.3d 508, 520-21 (8th Cir. 2009). See supra text
accompanying notes 169-70.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 173-74.
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prevail on a retaliation claim based on primary retaliatory disclosure.
Though the courts have granted litigants the right to proceed
anonymously in litigation involving sensitive issues of religion and
religious belief, those cases seem to be more motivated by the
concerns we associate with secondary disclosure than with the
humiliation, embarrassment, or invasion of privacy that marks the
other classes of cases involving sexuality, sexual orientation, sexual
assault, and the like." The anonymous litigants in the religion cases
were often minors and were objecting to practices and beliefs that
many in their communities held dear.28 9 Thus, they were more akin to
the role transgressors described below. There is nothing particularly
worrisome in this regard about the details of the Belmont Abbey
charge. 90
B. Secondary Retaliatory Disclosure
As discussed above, federal courts also consider the possibility
that a party will be subjected to retaliation or reprisal for his or her
involvement in the litigation when determining if the party should be
allowed to proceed anonymously.2 " This is a concern animated not by
the primary effect of the disclosure itself but by a concern that others
will learn about the litigation and then take action of their own
volition against the party as a result of that knowledge.2 2 The same
concern is active here. As the social science literature revealed,
whistleblowers are affected by their perception of the likelihood of
reprisal.2 93 The concern is that others will learn about their complaint
and cause them harm as a result. The more likely that is, the less
likely it is the employee will blow the whistle on the wrongful
behavior. Under some circumstances, an employer's disclosure of the
identity of a charging party increases the perceived or actual
likelihood of reprisal from those who learn about the charge such that
a reasonable employee faced with that threat of disclosure would
288. See supra Part III.A.1.
289. See supra Part III.A.1.i.
290. Arguably, an implication of the charge might be that the charging parties were
using birth control and family planning services that were no longer covered under the
Belmont Abbey insurance plan. Certainly, there is a privacy interest in such decisions and
practices, see generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (finding a
right to privacy in the U.S. Constitution, which protected a married couple's right to use
contraceptives), but it is unlikely that the interest should outweigh what we consider to be
the default rule that charging parties have no general right to expect their employers to
keep their identities confidential.
291. See supra Part III.A.
292. See supra Part IlI.A.
293. See supra Part III.B.1.
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forgo the opportunity to file the charge. The secondary effect-what
others do with the information the disclosure provides-is the threat.
Drawing the line between disclosures that are secondarily retaliatory
and those that are not should involve a more detailed inquiry,
balancing numerous factors that influence the likelihood of reprisal
and the behavior of would-be whistleblowers.
Courts confronted with determining whether a disclosure of the
charging party's identity was retaliatory should thus consider the
effect that disclosure might reasonably have or might be perceived to
cause. As a starting point, the Ninth Circuit's approach to
determining when the threat of retaliation warrants anonymity is
useful. That standard involves three factors: "(1) the severity of the
threatened harm; (2) the reasonableness of the anonymous party's
fears; and (3) the anonymous party's vulnerability to such
retaliation." 294 We adapt these three factors and add an additional
one that is uniquely implicated by disclosures of charging party
identity: the character or tone of the disclosure itself.295 We discuss
how these factors should be employed in evaluating a claim of
retaliatory disclosure, using the social science research detailed in
Part III.B to supplement and expand.
1. Severity of Possible Reprisal
The severity of threatened or perceived harm that flows from a
disclosure will affect how likely a disclosure would be to dissuade a
reasonable employee from making a charge in the first place. Easy
cases involve those where a specific threat of physical violence has
been made against a previously anonymous charging party.296
Certainly a disclosure looks more retaliatory if an employee has
reason to fear physical violence, assault, or intimidation should the
294. Does I thru XXIIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058,1068 (9th Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted).
295. In Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036 (9th
Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit enumerated the two additional factors: the threat of prejudice
to the opposing party and the public interest in freely available information. Id. at 1042
(citing Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1068). These factors, among other interests, are
subsumed in our "need to know" balancing standard described infra Part V.
296. One could envision, for instance, a situation in which an employee files a charge of
discrimination based on harassment by a coworker who, when confronted with the
allegation, threatens to hurt or kill whoever filed the complaint. Disclosure of the identity
of the complainant in such a situation raises the specter of severe harm. Though less
arresting than this hypothetical example, the experience of the nurse-plaintiff in Dunn v.
Washington County Hospital, 429 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2005), supports the claim as well.
There, the nurse's complaint was brought to the attention of the allegedly offending
doctor who warned her that "[p]aybacks are hell." Id. at 692.
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details of the charge be disclosed. The Advanced Textile court,
discussed previously, reasoned that this sort of extraordinary reprisal
activity-which in that case included the possibility of prosecution
and deportation-suggested anonymity was warranted.2 97 If the
charge of discrimination alleges systemic racial or sexual harassment,
for instance, disclosure would give the perpetrators a clear target for
intimidation and violence. In contrast, some disclosure might upset a
coworker or two, but realistically subject the charging party only to
fairly benign social ostracism or isolated comments of disapproval.
The latter would suggest the disclosure was not materially adverse. In
between those two extremes, courts should consider issues suggested
by the social science literature. For example, reactions tend to be
stronger when a marginalized individual challenges the dominant
social hierarchy directly. 298 Thus, the more directly the charge of
discrimination challenges powerful or entrenched interests in the
workplace or its surrounding community, the more the reaction to it
is likely to be extreme, particularly if the charge threatens to disrupt
an established social hierarchy. Likewise, the severity of the possible
reprisal increases as the charging party challenges the interests of a
dominant group qua group. In such situations, the risk of groupthink
influencing and escalating collective retaliatory activities is real. In
contrast, a conflict that is uniquely situated between two coworkers or
a supervisor and coworker is less likely to lead to severe reprisal
(absent special characteristics of the perpetrator, such as mental
illness or a history of violence).
Obviously, whether a reasonable employee would be dissuaded
from filing a charge based on these threats of reprisal should be
influenced by how dangerous or severe the perceived threat is. But
even nonviolent, social threats might dissuade a reasonable employee
from filing a charge if the threatened actions are highly likely to
occur. In this way, courts confronting retaliatory disclosure claims
would be well-served to call upon their experience with sexual
harassment claims. Though a certain level of severity of harassing
behavior is required for a claim to survive, less severe forms of
harassment can form the basis of the claim the more pervasive they
are.299 By analogy, the same holds true for cases of retaliatory
297. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1071; see also supra text accompanying notes
222-28 (discussing the case).
298. See supra Part II.B.2
299. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that severity
and pervasiveness are inversely related in making determinations on sexual harassment
claims); see also Laura D. Francis, Note, What Part of "Hostile Environment" Don't You
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disclosure. The more likely a reprisal of any kind, the more likely it is
to dissuade an employee from proceeding with a charge. Thus, we
proceed to discuss the considerations courts should use to determine
that likelihood.
2. Likelihood of Reprisal
In determining the likelihood of the threatened or feared reprisal
and, as a result, the "reasonableness of the [charging] party's fears,"3"
the social science research discussed above provides a framework for
this analysis. Courts should look to characteristics of the organization,
the perpetrator, and the complainant to determine this.
Organizational characteristics point to the likelihood of reprisal
or at least the reasonableness of a charging party's perception of that
likelihood. Courts should consider the history, organizational
structure, and homogeneity of the organization in evaluating
retaliatory disclosure claims. Institutions with a history of retaliatory
action or with a history of undermining the interests and efforts of
whistleblowers are more likely to encourage or allow reprisals.'
Thus, charging parties who are employed by such institutions are
justified in their fears, and courts should not easily dismiss the
possibility that a disclosure from such an organization has a
retaliatory motive. This makes prior charges of discrimination and
claims of retaliation relevant to the retaliatory disclosure claim. 302 In
addition, hierarchical organizations marked by authoritarian
leadership structures increase the threat of disclosure, because such
organizations are more likely to retaliate or tolerate retaliatory
actions by coworkers. This is especially true if the charging party has
challenged the hierarchy or a higher authority. Finally, homogeneous
organizations are more likely to retaliate against an outlier, especially
if the outlier challenges the orthodoxy shared by the rest of the
members of the organization. For instance, the charging parties in the
Belmont Abbey case challenged the orthodoxy of the shared beliefs
of the religious college, which made them major transgressors and the
potential targets of a unified group.
The characteristics of the perpetrator should also be a
Understand? The Need for an Entire-Environment Approach in Sexual Harassment Cases,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 815, 824-29, 832-33 (2004) (advocating that courts remember this
formula in making determinations about the "entire" environment in sexual harassment
claims).
300. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1068.
301. See supra note 245-46 and accompanying text.
302. See Rehg et al., supra note 206, at 227,234-36.
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consideration. To the extent the perpetrator is a powerful individual
in the organization, the victim is less likely to be protected from
reprisal and the disclosure more likely can be manipulated by the
powerful perpetrator to discourage and intimidate the complainant.
Dunn v. Washington County Hospital provides an illustrative
example.30 3 There, the nurse who complained about the allegedly
harassing behavior of the independent contractor physician with
whom she worked was clearly at a power deficit both in social and
organizational status as compared to the physician." The disclosure
of her identity to the physician, coupled with his reaction, would
reasonably be chilling to the nurse's or any subsequent victim's
resolve.
Related to that, the characteristics of the complainant affect the
likelihood of reprisal. The lower the power status of the complaining
employee, the more likely he is to be subject to reprisal, especially if
he is isolated from the organization's powerbrokers.so When the
complainant is a member of an outside group or otherwise a
demographic outlier, this effect is exacerbated.30 6 When the employee
is a pioneer (i.e., the "first" or "only" of his or her type working at a
location or in a job), the reasonableness of the fear of reprisal is
stronger.30
3. Vulnerability of Employee
The characteristics of the employee not only affect how likely
reprisal is, but also how vulnerable to that reprisal he or she may be.
The federal courts consider this in determining whether to allow a
party to proceed anonymously. Children, for instance, are more
vulnerable, 08 as are victims of sexual assault. In this context,
pioneers are not only more likely to be subject to reprisal, but are
more likely to be vulnerable to its effects. They generally lack a
support structure and are isolated from the power structure of the
303. See supra text accompanying notes 122-28 (describing the case).
304. See Dunn v. Washington Cnty. Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 694 (7th Cir. 2005) (Rovner,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Dunn posits that the Hospital sat on its
hands while Coy harassed her because Coy, as its principal surgeon, was worth much more
to the Hospital in revenue than she or any other nurse.").
305. See supra notes 246-53 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
308. See supra Part III.A.1.a (discussing the vulnerability of children in the context of
courts' decisions to let litigants proceed anonymously).
309. See supra Part III.A.1.c (discussing courts' mixed decisions to grant anonymity to
victims of sexual assault).
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organization. Individuals like the Belmont Abbey employees who
reject the prevailing beliefs or attitudes of an otherwise unified
workforce likewise are vulnerable.
The relative power of the employee in the organization
(particularly in relation to the perpetrator) may make the employee
more vulnerable. That is especially the case if coworkers and others
have reason to rally around the perpetrator, either out of blind
allegiance or out of the possibility of garnering favor with a powerful
individual. Charging parties who lack power on multiple dimensions
are the most vulnerable and are most likely dissuaded by the threat of
disclosure.
4. Form and Tone of Disclosure
Though closely related to some of the foregoing, we recommend
that courts should also evaluate the form and tone of the disclosure.
As described in Part I.B, courts have previously considered this."'
When a disclosure goes to the entire organization, from a highly
powerful official, describing and objecting to the charge and
identifying the charging parties specifically by name, as happened at
Belmont Abbey, the thumb should be on the scale of finding the
disclosure materially adverse. Contrast that with situations of
disclosure of the details of the charge without specifically identifying
the charging party31' or inadvertent (or at least noncalculated) oral
disclosures of the charging party's identity. As the retaliatory motive
of the employer becomes clearer based on the form and tone of the
disclosure, the burden on the employee to prove the likelihood that a
reasonable employee would be dissuaded by the disclosure should
lighten.
5. Totality of the Circumstances
No single factor that we have described should be dispositive.
Rather, we provide these considerations to delineate a consistent and
principled approach to determining when a form of confidentiality
310. See, e.g., Franklin v. Local 2 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 565 F.3d 508,
521 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding that union's actions of posting plaintiffs' names on documents
that were seen by other employees and reading aloud plaintiffs' names at union meetings
created a question of material fact regarding retaliation for plaintiffs' discrimination claim
with the EEOC).
311. See, e.g., Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d 803, 824 (Tenn. 2007) (finding that press
releases which did not state plaintiffs "identity or any information from which others
could easily identify her" and which did not "make[] any affirmative allegations against"
her were not "materially adverse"), abrogated by Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320
S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010).
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should be foisted on an employer in the charge process. Ultimately,
White's reasonable employee standard is incapable of accommodating
a bright-line test for retaliatory disclosure or any other type of alleged
retaliatory action.
Moreover, we recognize that the claim of retaliatory disclosure is
somewhat at odds with incentives that are otherwise embedded in
employment discrimination law; namely, to proactively engage in
investigation and to take immediate corrective actions when potential
violations of the law are discovered. Those may encourage or
require the disclosure of the charging party's identity. The next Part
addresses how courts should incorporate these considerations.
V. DISCLOSURE AS ADVERSE ACTION UNLESS A DEFENSE EXISTS
FOR "NEED TO KNOW"
The Supreme Court's decision in White stated clearly that, when
it comes to judging whether acts undertaken by an employer amount
to actionable retaliation, "[c]ontext matters."1 3 This is nowhere more
true than in considering whether disclosure of a complainant's
identity amounts to a materially adverse action. The employer has an
obligation to participate in EEOC investigations of charges. As one
court noted, disclosure of an EEOC charge of discrimination to the
accused's supervisor is necessary for the discipline process.314
While it is certainly true that investigations and appropriate
discipline are reasonable practices for an employer confronted with
an EEOC charge, disclosure outside the normal expectations presents
an altogether different context. In the Belmont Abbey case, the
President of the College disclosed the names of individual faculty
members responsible for filing the EEOC charge against the College
in an e-mail received not only by all other faculty members, but also
by all staff and students at Belmont Abbey. 15 This broad publication,
without another purpose, suggests an attempt to shame or ostracize
the complainants to produce a "chilling effect.""' Similarly, the
Eighth Circuit found in Franklin that some of the union's actions to
keep members informed of legal fees-such as announcing the
plaintiffs' names aloud at the meetings-might have published the
312. See supra Part II.A.2.
313. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006).
314. Hertenstein v. Kimberly Home Health Care, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1255 (D.
Kan. 1999) (calling it an "integral part of the disciplinary process"),
315. Stripling,supra note 5.
316. Id. (citing a March 5, 2009 letter from Victoria Mackey, EEOC Senior
Investigator, to the faculty members filing charges).
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plaintiffs' identities more widely than necessary. "
There is a clear need to balance the necessary actions an
employer must take when confronted with a discrimination claim and
the right for an employee to pursue such claims without fear of
reprisal. If that standard were to go too far in the employer's favor,
employers could undermine the effectiveness of the
antidiscrimination statutes with campaigns to terrorize complaining
employees into silence. If, in contrast, the standard protected
employee privacy at all cost, employers would be hamstrung to
investigate, address, and correct potentially unlawful actions, and
would be powerless to defend against employees' claims. Thus, the
balance must formalize the twin notions of considering the context of
disclosure and the breadth of publication to determine whether
actionable retaliation occurred.
The courts have utilized a similar balance when addressing tort
doctrine in defamation and invasion of privacy claims. Often in such
common law cases the issue concerns who "needs to know" the
information, or the "publication" requirement, as it is known in
defamation law."' Courts in many jurisdictions do not consider
intracorporate communications to meet the publication requirement
on the theory of agency within a company.319 The four rights
contained with the privacy tort contain stronger parallels to the "need
to know" defense in Title VII retaliatory disclosure in that they do
not rely on a false publication damaging to an individual but rest on
an individual's right "to be let alone."3 20 It is the publication of a
claim itself, not the truth or falsity of the claim, which makes it
actionable. However, as with defamation, publication to those who
have an appropriate interest in the information is protected as
privileged.
We have identified two ways courts could utilize this "need to
317. See supra text accompanying notes 157-71.
318. See Frank J. Cavico, Defamation in the Private Sector: The Libelous and
Slanderous Employer, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 405, 412 (1999) (noting that the essential
elements of defamation include "a false statement of fact, harmful to the reputation, of
and concerning the plaintiff, an unprivileged publication to a third party, causation, and
damages").
319. See Luckey v. Goia, 496 S.E.2d 539, 541 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) ("To hold otherwise
could impede legitimate inquiries by employers into employee conduct."); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmts. e, i (1977).
320. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). The four acts
contained within the invasion of privacy tort are: intrusion into private life, public
disclosure of embarrassing facts, publicity that places an individual in a false light, and the




know" balancing of employer interests as part of the retaliatory
disclosure claim.3" Courts may consider unprivileged communication
as an element of causation similar to the defamation claim. In this
way, claiming retaliatory motive would include showing the disclosure
was made outside of those who need to know the information for
legitimate employer interests. Alternatively, the "need to know" may
be considered a defense available to an employer to show that the
disclosure was necessary in the context of the situation and the
breadth of publication. In other words, the employer could defend on
the grounds that, despite the potential chilling effect of the disclosure,
it had a legitimate nonretaliatory motive for doing so.
In the Belmont Abbey case, the identities of the faculty members
filing a complaint of discrimination based on a change in the College's
health insurance plan were made public to all faculty, staff, and
students in an e-mail notifying the College community about the
complaint." In this circumstance, Belmont Abbey would have
difficulty establishing the "need to know" balancing using either
theory. As an element of causation, the faculty members would use
the broadly distributed e-mail publication that provided unnecessary
details of an EEOC filing concerning the change in health insurance.
Naming the faculty members involved seemingly added nothing to
the information other than to put them in an uncomfortable position
of being ostracized by their president and the College community.
Alternatively, as a defense to a claim of retaliation, it seems unlikely
that the breadth of publication and the specificity of the publication
were necessary for a full investigation of the complaint.
An e-mail or other type of broad publication that did not involve
naming the faculty members involved in the complaint may meet the
"need to know" standard under each of the theories proffered. If the
publication was meant to address a controversial change in policy and
offer transparency as well as a reinforcement of the decision as a
321. But cf. Steven Seidenfeld, Note, Employer Liability Under Title VII: Creating an
Employer Affirmative Defense for Retaliation Claims, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1319, 1323
(2008) (advocating for an affirmative defense for employers similar to that used in sexual
harassment claims to counter the "unintended consequences" of White).
322. Stripling, supra note 5.
323. Compare Lafate v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 123 F. Supp. 2d. 773, 779 (D. Del.
2000) (declining to set aside a verdict of Title VII retaliation because, among other things,
the plaintiffs employer unnecessarily disclosed the details of the EEOC charge
internally), with Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d 803, 824 (Tenn. 2007) (declining to find
retaliation based on the employer's public denial of a sexual harassment allegation
because none of the statements named the plaintiff or otherwise provided information that
would lead to the discovery of her identity), abrogated by Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co.,
320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010).
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public relations measure, it is possible that a court would view this as
necessary for the employer's interests rather than retaliatory.
Admittedly, however, it will remain more difficult to satisfy the "need
to know" balancing of employer's interests in this framework when
the publication goes beyond those participating in an investigation of
the complaint.
CONCLUSION
Belmont Abbey did not discriminate against its employees based
on religion, as the EEOC determined, despite outrage among many
that might suggest otherwise. However, in publicly disclosing the
names of the eight faculty members who sought to utilize the process
established for asserting employee rights against discrimination, the
College may have sought to discourage other employees from taking
similar actions. The facts of the Belmont Abbey incident demonstrate
a doctrinal gap in the competing interests of employers and
employees.
In the absence of clear guidance from Title VII, the EEOC
regulatory documents, and the existing case law, this Article turned to
analogous authority dealing with anonymity in federal court
litigation, as well as the social science literature addressing the
motivations of whistleblowers and the antecedents of retribution
against whistleblowers to develop a framework for retaliatory
disclosure. As the framework establishes, employer disclosures may
both directly dissuade complainants and create secondary chilling
effects. Disclosures, then, serve a significant role in discouraging
employees from exercising rights established under Title VII. This
Article recognizes, however, there remains a need to balance the
interests of employers in appropriate disclosures. It recommends a
standard for retaliatory disclosure that considers disclosure an
adverse action unless a "need to know" defense exists.
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